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Article 
“Mentally Defective” Language in the Gun Control 
Act  
JANA R. MCCREARY 
The oft-quoted argument asserts that “Guns don’t kill people; people kill 
people.”  It is essential, then, that gun legislation clearly address who the people 
are who should not possess or purchase guns.  As the country once again reacts to 
a tragedy with renewed interest in implementing new gun legislation, we must use 
caution to clearly identify who should be restricted from acquiring firearms.   
The Gun Control Act of 1968 and its subsequent amendments fail at this task.  
When considering the ease with which persons with dangerous mental illnesses 
may legally purchase firearms because they do not meet technical and vague 
requirements under the Act—requirements put in place to prevent such persons 
from possessing firearms—it is clear that the Act fails.  Tragic consequences 
result: six people dead at a grocery store in Tucson, Arizona at the hands of Jared 
Lee Loughner; twelve people dead at the hands of James E. Holmes in Aurora, 
Colorado.  Additionally, when information to warn against illegal purchase of 
firearms is not requested due to ill-informed interpretations of the language, 
tragic consequences result: thirty-three people dead at the Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University at the hands of Seung Hui Cho. Loughner, Holmes, 
and Cho had shown signs of mental illness.  Loughner, Holmes, and Cho 
purchased their firearms, the firearms they used for the murders they committed, 
from federally licensed firearms dealers.  Loughner did so legally.  Holmes did so 
legally.  Cho did so without vital information regarding his dangerousness ever 
being reported.  These three men slipped through the cracks and fifty-one people 
died as a result.  The cracks exist due to the Act’s language and its 
interpretation—its defective language.   
This Article addresses the failure of the Gun Control Act regarding persons 
with dangerous mental illness who purchase firearms in spite of their status of 
being dangerously mentally ill.  By looking at two headline-grabbing cases, the 
Article explores the dire consequences of the Act’s vague—and even misleading—
language.  Alternative approaches, including issuing permits, are suggested as 
means to help prevent such tragic outcomes and to guide new legislation.  
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“Mentally Defective” Language in the Gun Control 
Act 
JANA R. MCCREARY

 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In January 2011, Jared Lee Loughner carried his Glock 19 
semiautomatic handgun loaded with a high-capacity magazine to a 
constituents meeting outside a grocery store in Tuscon, Arizona.  There, he 
opened fire, killing six people and wounding over a dozen more.  News 
channels across the country captured the story and wrestled to explain this 
horrific tragedy.
1
  First came the accusations of political motivation: in 
Loughner’s belongings, police found letters and notes that suggested 
Loughner was particularly upset with Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords’s 
politics.
2
  Upon closer examination, however, the writings—which 
                                                                                                                          
 Associate Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law.  I dedicate this Article to the 
memory of my father, Dr. Karon G. McCreary, who died June 26, 2012.  He and I spoke many, many 
times on the issues of gun policy—he as an avid hunter and firearms collector, and me as his daughter 
whom he took shooting and whom he gave her first firearm—but me also as an attorney who, with an 
appellate court, worked on too many murder cases involving a death due to an easily-accessible 
firearm.  My father and I, thus, often disagreed on some of the broad issues.  But on the details, such as 
the problem I identify in this Article, he agreed a solution was needed.  I regret we never got to discuss 
those possible solutions more. 
Also, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Sara McCollum and the other editors of the 
Connecticut Law Review.  Their careful assistance in this piece—and their patience granted me during 
a difficult year—have no doubt helped make this a better work.  In the end, of course, any errors or 
omissions are entirely my responsibility. 
1 See, e.g., Linda Feldmann, Why Jared Loughner Was Allowed to Buy a Gun, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Jan. 10, 2011 (describing how gun control laws allowed Jared Loughner to buy a gun 
despite evidence of mental instability); see also United States v. Loughner, 769 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1189 
(D. Ariz. 2011) (describing the facts of the shooting). 
2 Compare Timothy Fitz, AZ Shooter Jared Lee Loughner: Charged with Shooting Gabrielle 
Giffords, Killing Others, Inspired by Sarah Palin Tea Party?, CHI. NEWS REP. (Jan. 8, 2011), 
http://www.chicagonewsreport.com/2011/01/az-shooter-jared-lee-loughner-charged.html (theorizing 
that Sarah Palin and the Tea Party inspired Loughner to commit the crime), with Chris Stirewalt, The 
Scary World of Jared Loughner; Dems Target Political Speech, FOXNEWS.COM (Jan. 10, 2011), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/01/10/scary-world-jared-loughner-dems-target-political-speech/ 
(arguing that Loughner was “a true loner whose interests and fixations [did not] meet any conventional 
political definition”).  See also John Cloud, The Troubled Life of Jared Loughner, TIME, Jan. 15, 2011, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2042358,00.html (suggesting that 
mental illness, not political rhetoric, led Loughner to attack Congresswoman Giffords).  The Times 
story continued: 
It will never be possible to stop every unhinged person from committing awful 
crimes.  But in the wake of the Tucson tragedy, we should be talking about how to 
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mentioned Giffords—appeared incoherent.3  What followed was an 
investigation into who Loughner was: a young man with disturbed 
thoughts who had inspired fear in those who knew him about his potential 
for violence.
4
   
The next development in the story revealed that Loughner had 
purchased the gun he used, the Glock 19 semiautomatic handgun, fewer 
than six weeks before the shooting.
5
  He purchased it from a federally 
licensed firearms dealer.  He purchased it legally.
6
  Despite having been 
ejected from a higher education program due to his bizarre behavior and 
recommendations for mental health intervention, he did not meet any of the 
restrictions against gun purchases.
7
 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the right to purchase guns 
(albeit narrowly discussed by the Court as the right to possess handguns in 
one’s home for self-defense purposes) is an individual right, fully 
applicable to the states.
8
  But this right is not without limitations.  This 
right may be taken away.  The Gun Control Act of 1968 (Gun Control 
Act), along with its amendments, narrows the pool of citizens who may 
legally purchase firearms from licensed dealers.  One way that pool is 
limited is through a judicial determination of incompetency, or as a 
consequence of commitment in a mental institution.
9
  However, the 
                                                                                                                          
provide more mental-health care to those who display signs of needing it, not having 
a debate about whether rhetoric on TV and Twitter killed those six people. 
Id. 
3 See, e.g., Profile of Suspect Jared Loughner: “I Can’t Trust the Current Government,” MSNBC 
(Jan. 9, 2011, 1:36 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40980334/ns/us_news-
crime_and_courts/t/profile-suspect-jared-loughner-i-cant-trust-current-government#.UJLtdYUU7k0 
(providing the text of many of Loughner’s “rants”). 
4 Id. 
5 Feldmann, supra note 1. 
6 Id. 
7 See id. (describing how Loughner’s documented mental problems did not prevent him from 
buying the gun used in the shooting). 
8 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (applying the Second Amendment 
to the states); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (interpreting a right to possess 
handguns for personal self-defense).  A recent Seventh Circuit decision may push the boundaries of this 
“self defense in the home” limitation.  See Moore v. Madigan, 2012 WL 6156062, at *8 (7th Cir. Dec 
11, 2012) (concluding that the limits prohibiting carrying firearms in public were too restrictive without 
justification). 
9 Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2006).  One of the major objectives of the Gun 
Control Act was to deny specific populations access to firearms—felons, minors, and “persons who had 
been adjudicated as mental defectives or committed to mental institutions.”  Franklin E. Zimring, 
Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 133, 149 (1975).  
Although many states have adopted gun control laws with different language, the focus of this Article 
will remain on the federal language in the Gun Control Act.  The essential argument, even though states 
may expand rights of their citizens, is that this should be a baseline of prohibitions that should not be 
expanded.  If a state expands those rights that might be understood in Heller, it would lessen the 
prohibitions. 
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contours of these limitations are anything but clear, such that the individual 
right to bear arms may very well do more harm than good.
10
  The future of 
Second Amendment litigation will be in challenging those laws that restrict 
rights of gun ownership and use.  Because lower courts must work through 
issues of standards of review and due process,
11
 it is difficult to predict if 
many of the existing limitations in gun control will survive challenges.  
However, with the Court’s allusion to “presumptively lawful regulatory 
measures,”12 which included an acknowledgement of the “longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by . . . the mentally ill,”13 it 
seems safe to believe that the limitations on those “adjudicated as a mental 
defective or . . . committed to any mental institution”14 should be upheld. 
Based on behavioral reports by those close to him,
15
 however, Jared 
Loughner appears to have suffered from mental illness when he killed six 
people.
16
  And many of those who knew him feared him to be dangerous.  
                                                                                                                          
10 See, e.g., Michael B. de Leeuw et al., Ready, Aim, Fire?  District of Columbia v. Heller and 
Communities of Color, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 133, 148–50 (2009) (analyzing statistics that 
suggest handgun violence increases as regulation of ownership decreases). 
11 See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Five Takes on McDonald v. Chicago, 26 J.L. & 
POL. 273, 296–97 (2011) (pointing out the repeated denial of the Court—and even the plurality—to 
articulate a standard of review in either Heller or McDonald).  Lower courts are addressing the area of 
an appropriate standard of review for the newly-recognized fundamental right under the Second 
Amendment.  Some are also extending this right to beyond the home.  For example, in Illinois, an 
appellate court applied an intermediate level of review in holding a statute that “prohibit[ed] the 
carrying of an uncased, loaded and accessible firearm in the public street even by a law-abiding citizen 
for the lawful purpose of self-defense” was constitutional because the statute’s goal was substantial and 
important while also reasonable (even if imperfect).  People v. Mimes, 953 N.E.2d 55, 73 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2011) (“[A]n individual’s need for self-defense does not disappear outside the home.”).  An appellate 
court in Minnesota likewise applied intermediate scrutiny to hold constitutional a state law that 
prohibited possession of a firearm by a person who had been convicted of a “truly violent” crime.  State 
v. Craig, 807 N.W.2d 453, 462, 464 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (relying heavily on Heller’s reference to 
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures” language); see also United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 
85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to conclude that a prohibition against 
possession of unmarked firearms is constitutional because the law did not impose a burden that 
“severely limit[ed] the possession of firearms,” but also recognizing that Second Amendment 
challenges may be subject to different standards of review based on the restriction being considered).  
And at least one court has indicated that Heller has implemented a due process requirement before 
removal of Second Amendment rights.  United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(applying Heller’s due process guarantee to a person whose Second Amendment rights were withdrawn 
after a temporary involuntary emergency hospitalization).   
12 Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26. 
13 Id. at 626. 
14 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4). 
15 Kate Pickert & John Cloud, If You Think Someone Is Mentally Ill: Loughner’s Six Warning 
Signs, TIME (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2041733,00.html. 
16 Marc Lacey, Lawyers for Defendant in Giffords Shooting Seem to Be Searching for Illness, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011, at A13 (noting two experts having diagnosed Loughner with schizophrenia 
and that he has been subjected to forced medication pending a determination of competency to stand 
trial). 
Loughner pleaded guilty on August 7, 2012.  See Bill Whitaker, Loughner Found Competent, 
Pleads Guilty in Tucson Rampage, CBS NEWS (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
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Even so—like many others who have legally purchased firearms in spite of 
bizarre behavior observed by friends, associates, and loved ones—
Loughner was able to purchase a gun. 
The prohibition against the mentally ill possessing a firearm will likely 
be held constitutional, but that is not the concern.  Instead, the problem lies 
in all those people who are dangerously mentally ill
17
 but who do not fall 
under the language of the Gun Control Act.  The language is vague at best 
and misleading at worst.  Stronger restrictions need to be in place.  A 
permit should be required.   
This Article brings to light the problems with the inconsistent 
interpretation and application of the Gun Control Act language that 
attempts to prevent persons with dangerous mental illnesses from 
purchasing firearms.  Part II explains the inadequacies in some 
interpretations of the Gun Control Act by detailing two particularly deadly 
instances in which someone with a clear mental disorder legally purchased 
firearms and then used those weapons to commit mass murders.  Part II 
also highlights several other examples of persons with mental disorders 
accessing and using firearms with fatal consequences.  Part III analyzes the 
language of the Gun Control Act as it relates to issues involving mental 
illness: “adjudicated as a mental defective” or “committed to a mental 
institution.”18  Part III also reviews the various interpretations of that 
language.  Part IV then suggests alternative approaches—each of which 
                                                                                                                          
18563_162-57488717/loughner-found-competent-pleads-guilty-in-tucson-
rampage/?tag=contentMain;contentBody. 
17 The use of the term “dangerously mentally ill” is used not as a medical diagnosis, but as a term 
intended to highlight that not all mental illness should be treated similarly under the Gun Control Act. 
Mental illnesses are medical conditions that disrupt a person’s thinking, feeling, 
mood, ability to relate to others and daily functioning. . . . Serious mental illnesses 
include major depression, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, obsessive compulsive 
disorder (OCD), panic disorder, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 
borderline personality disorder.  
What Is Mental Illness: Mental Illness Facts, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, 
http://www.nami.org/template.cfm?section=about_mental_illness (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).  
Although one in four adults in the United States experiences a mental health disorder each year, only 
one in seventeen suffer from a “serious mental illness.”  Id.; see also NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL 
ILLNESS, MENTAL ILLNESS: FACTS AND NUMBERS, available at http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?S
ection=About_Mental_Illness&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=531
55 (providing statistics on mental illness).  Still, even among those who suffer from a serious mental 
illness, they are not all dangerously mentally ill.  The focus in this Article is on those who have a 
dangerous mental illness.  Unfortunately, Congress failed clearly to make such a distinction in the 
language of the Gun Control Act.  Thus, the Gun Control Act is both under-inclusive, as described in 
this Article, and over-inclusive, as based on the variety of diagnoses considered to be a “serious mental 
illness.” What Is Mental Illness: Mental Illness Facts, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, 
http://www.nami.org/template.cfm?section=about_mental_illness (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).  Not all 
of these mental illnesses, however, should necessarily remove a right to possess a firearm for self-
defense if a current danger does not exist. 
18 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4). 
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will need to be further developed in the future as new legislation is 
introduced—to prevent the recurrence of these deadly tragedies.  The 
objective of this Article is to highlight the existing problems and to begin a 
dialogue to find solutions. 
II.  THE DANGER OF THE DANGEROUSLY MENTALLY ILL:   
HINDSIGHT IS TOO LATE 
When people debate gun control laws, those in opposition often argue 
that we do not need gun control because “guns don’t kill people; people 
kill people.”  And kill, these people did: Jarod Lee Loughner killed six 
people—and wounded thirteen more—on January 8, 2011.  James Eagan 
Holmes killed twelve people—and wounded fifty-eight more—on July 20, 
2012.  Both Loughner and Holmes had previously shown signs of mental 
illness, causing those around them to express fear.  Both Loughner and 
Holmes used guns subsequently in mass murders.  Both Loughner and 
Holmes purchased their guns, seemingly legally, from federally licensed 
firearms dealers.
19
  These are their stories.
20
  
                                                                                                                          
19 Even when dangerously mentally ill have been identified, the necessary information is not 
always reported in order to disqualify them from firearm purchase; deadly consequences have 
followed.  Seung Hui-Cho killed thirty-two students and faculty members on April 16, 2007 even 
though he had been declared dangerous as a result of mental illness.  VIRGINIA TECH REVIEW PANEL, 
MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH:  REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA TECH REVIEW PANEL vii (2007) 
[hereinafter REPORT], available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/metro/documents/vatechreport.pdf.  Cho used only two firearms during his shooting rampage in 
April 2007.  Id. at 71  The Virginia Tech Review Panel acknowledged in its review conducted after 
Cho murdered over thirty people that Virginia State law was unclear regarding whether Cho was 
legally eligible to purchase a firearm.  Id. at 71–72.  However, he did not purchase his firearms legally 
under federal law; he should have been prohibited: a special justice had ruled that Cho “present[ed] an 
imminent danger to himself as a result of mental illness.”  Id. at 48.  As the Panel concluded,  
 Cho was not legally authorized to purchase his firearms, but was easily able to 
do so.  Gun purchasers in Virginia must qualify to buy a firearm under both 
federal and state law.  Federal law disqualified Cho from purchasing or 
possessing a firearm.  The federal Gun Control Act, originally passed in 1968, 
prohibits gun purchases by anyone who “has been adjudicated as a mental 
defective or who has been committed to a mental institution.”  Federal 
regulations interpreting the act define “adjudicated as a mental defective” as “[a] 
determination by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority that a 
person, as a result of . . . mental illness . . . [i]s a danger to himself or to others.”  
Cho was found to be a danger to himself by a special justice of the Montgomery 
County General District Court on December 14, 2005.  Therefore, under federal 
law, Cho could not purchase any firearm. 
Id. at 71.  Congress stated, in referencing Cho’s shootings as an impetus to its NICS Improvement Act, 
“In spite of a proven history of mental illness, the shooter was able to purchase the two firearms used in 
the shooting.”  NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-180, § 2(9), 121 Stat. 
2559, 2559–60 (2008).  However, both of these reports appear to want to blame communication or Cho 
for his firearm purchase.   
Problems lie not only in failed communication of Cho’s status making him unable to possess or 
purchase firearms, but also in youth support services and systems.  Cho experienced a sharp downward 
spiral that occurred in college—a sad example of the problems that arise in making accommodations in 
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A.  Jared Lee Loughner 
On January 8, 2011, Jared Lee Loughner, armed with a Glock 19 
semiautomatic handgun with a high-capacity magazine,
21
 approached a 
political appearance by Representative Gabrielle Giffords at a Tucson 
grocery store and opened fire.
22
  He killed six people, including a nine-
year-old girl and Federal District Judge John Roll, and he wounded thirteen 
others, including Representative Giffords.
23
  Loughner purchased his 
firearm from Sportsman’s Warehouse after passing a National Instant 
Check System (NICS) background check.
24
  His purchase, from all 
appearances, was legal.  
                                                                                                                          
an academic setting without following through with supportive services and systems of accountability 
throughout one’s education.  This could continue, though, into one’s employment as an adult; the 
student who cannot learn due to poor social skills may very well need more support than just removing 
him from the classroom.  As we continue to make these accommodations for children, we are setting 
ourselves up for a segment of the next generation who cannot cope with stress, disagreements, or the 
simple relations that are required to function daily.  In Cho’s case, this occurred because his 
accommodations for his emotional disability were not in his educational record.  REPORT, supra, at 37.  
Cho’s high school transcripts did not reveal that he had received special education services.  Id. at 38. 
In asking why records of serious emotional disturbance were not included in Cho’s file, the 
Virginia Tech Review Panel stated: 
 The answer is obvious: personal privacy.  And while the panel respects this 
answer, it is important to examine the extent to which such information is 
altogether banned or could be released at the institution’s discretion.  No one 
wants to stigmatize a person or deny her or him opportunities because of mental 
or physical disability.  Still, there are issues of public safety.  That is why 
immunization records must be submitted to each new institution.  But there are 
other significant threats facing students beyond measles, mumps, or polio. 
Id. at 38. 
The Panel reported that although a high school may disclose the information, a university may not 
inquire about it before admission.  Id.  Further, a student has no duty to inform a school about a 
disability.  Id. at 39.  The Panel recommended that this issue be studied further.  See, e.g., COUNCIL OF 
STATE GOV’TS, Protecting Students and Students’ Rights a Delicate Issue, Campus Violence and 
Mental Health, available at http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/MentalHealth-
CampusSafety.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2012) (stating that privacy concerns regarding sharing of 
mental health records may be misunderstood by educational institutions, especially in the case of 
emergencies); see also Ann MacLean Massie, Symposium: Introduction, 17 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. 
& SOC. JUST. 1, 2 (2010) (noting how often students enter college with psychiatric issues but without 
the support of counseling, medication, or awareness of their conditions by those around them). 
20 No compilation of background and descriptions is available for Loughner’s or Holmes’s stories.  
Theirs, therefore, are pieced together through news reports, some court documents, and school records.   
21 Feldmann, supra note 1; see also Jared Loughner ID’d as Giffords Shooting Suspect, CBS 
NEWS (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-7226347.html (describing the 
magazine used by Loughner in the shooting). 
22 Alan Duke, Loughner Sentenced to Life for Arizona Shootings, CNN (Nov. 8, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/08/justice/arizona-loughner-sentencing/index.html; Whitaker, supra note 
16. 
23 Cloud, supra note 2; Gabrielle Giffords, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/reference/timestopics/people/g/gabrielle_giffords/index.html. 
24 Feldmann, supra note 1. 
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Loughner dropped out of high school before his senior year.
25
  His 
friends lost touch with him but have reported that he “seemed out of it, like 
he was somewhere else,” concluding that the change in behavior was not 
due, simply, to alcohol or marijuana.
26
  Others reported that he spoke “in 
random strings of words” and “became paranoid that the government was 
trying to control him.”27  Then he entered college.  Loughner continued 
taking classes for five years at Pima Community College; after his bizarre 
behavior became focused at the school, however, he was asked to leave.
28
 
Five years after beginning classes at Pima Community College, 
Loughner’s behavior became notable.  The Pima Community College 
police had contact with Loughner five times due to his disruptive behavior 
over a  seven-month period in 2010.
29
  In the months leading up to the 
shootings, Loughner demonstrated even more bizarre behavior at Pima.  In 
a math class, he shouted, “How can you deny math instead of accepting 
it?”30  And on an exam, he wrote, “Eat + Sleep + Brush Teeth = Math,” 
demonstrating disordered thoughts, and he showed signs of paranoia when 
he told “a classmate that U.S. currency was worthless and that the 
government was seeking to control people through grammar.”31   
Loughner’s classmates noted his behavior and their fears.  One 
classmate wrote in an email, “He scares me a bit.  The teacher tried to 
throw him out and he refused to go.”32  Almost two weeks later, the same 
student said in another email, “He scares the living crap out of me.”33  
Loughner’s teacher was finally successful in having him removed from the 
class four weeks later—four weeks after his initial complaints were met 
with responses pointing out that Loughner had not hurt anyone or brought 
weapons to the school.
34
 
Although it seems accurate that Loughner had not actually hurt anyone 
or displayed any weapons, his behavior caused disruption and fear.  At the 
same time, it seems the due process procedures in place for removing a 
                                                                                                                          
25 Cloud, supra note 2. 
26 Id. (quoting Kylie Smith, who had known Loughner since preschool); see also Pickert & Cloud, 
supra note 15 (listing six warning signs that were indicative of mental illness in Loughner). 
27 Cloud, supra note 2. 
28 Pima Community College Statement on Today’s Tragic Events, PIMA CMTY. COLL. (Jan. 8, 
2011), http://www.pima.edu/press-room/news-releases/2011/201101-loughnerjan8.html [hereinafter 
Pima Statement].  
29 Id. 
30 Timothy Noah, Class Clown: Why Was It So Hard to Kick Loughner out of Pima Community 
College?, SLATE (Jan. 10, 2011, 7:49 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_customer/2011/
01/class_clown.html. 
31 Pickert & Cloud, supra note 15. 
32 Noah, supra note 30. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
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student at Pima Community College might have been a barrier to assuring 
the safety of all the other students and faculty on campus.
35
 
On September 29, 2010, the school discovered a video on YouTube 
that Loughner had recorded.
36
  In this video, Loughner claimed that the 
school was “illegal according to the U.S. Constitution,”37 that the school 
was “a scam,” and that Pima and its students and teachers were 
“illiterate.”38  After the discovery, the college immediately issued a letter 
of suspension that was delivered by campus police to Loughner at the 
residence he shared with his parents.
39
  Other than following up to discuss 
the Code of Conduct and the suspension, the school prohibited Loughner 
from returning to Pima Community College.
40
  
Less than a week later, on October 4, 2010, Loughner and his parents 
met with school administrators.
41
  Loughner agreed to withdraw from 
school.
42
  A few days later, the school sent a final correspondence to 
Loughner indicating that “if he intends to return to the College, [Loughner] 
must resolve his Code of Conduct violations and obtain a mental health 
                                                                                                                          
35 See id. (detailing the “due-process gauntlet” at Pima Community College, a comprehensive 
internal process involving numerous evaluative reviews).  After tragedies of mass shootings, such as 
that at Virginia Tech, one might think schools would have a heightened sense of awareness of students 
whose behavior should send not only cautionary, but bright red, waving flags.  When balancing the fear 
of litigation over removing a student from class with the chance that the student might actually become 
violent, perhaps the business interest wins.  But when facing such issues in higher education, it would 
seem that the interest of all the other students and faculty being able to learn and work in a secure 
environment should outweigh any others.  As posed by one journalist who wrote about the Tucson 
shootings, “What does a kid have to do these days to get kicked out of community college?” and “What 
about students who persistently disrupt classes but are simply jerks—or nonviolent nutcases?”  Id.  
Would they also be allowed to stay in school and in classes?  Surely no employer would allow such 
person to remain employed.  Why do we allow today’s youth the ability to engage in such behavior? 
36 Pima Statement, supra note 28.  Loughner apparently had posted several videos to YouTube.  
Rick Rojas, Jared Lee Loughner, Shooting Suspect, Leaves YouTube Rants, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/08/nation/la-na-jared-loughner-20110109.  Some of Loughner’s 
videos displayed text such as “[my] hope—is for you to be literate!” and “[i]f you’re literate in English 
grammar, then you comprehend English grammar,” as well as “[t]he majority of people, who reside in 
District-8, are illiterate—hilarious.  I don’t control your English grammar structure, but you control 
your English grammar structure.”  Id. (quoting printed text on videos allegedly uploaded to YouTube 
by Loughner).  Loughner also “wrote of creating a new system of currency and designing coins: 
‘You’re distributing your new currency lethally to people or you’re distributing your new currency 
non-lethally to people.’”  Id. (quoting printed text on videos allegedly uploaded to YouTube by 
Loughner).  “‘I know who’s listening: Government Officials, and the People,’” read one video. Id. 
(quoting printed text on videos allegedly uploaded to YouTube by Loughner).  “‘Nearly all the people, 
who don’t know this accurate information of a new currency, aren’t aware of mind control and 
brainwash methods.  If I have my civil rights, then this message wouldn’t have happen [sic].’” Id. 
37 Pima Statement, supra note 28. 
38 Noah, supra note 30. 
39 See Pima Statement, supra note 28 (describing the timeline of events leading to Loughner’s 
dismissal from Pima Community College). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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clearance indicating, in the opinion of a mental health professional, his 
presence at the College does not present a danger to himself or others.”43 
Three months later, six people died at the other end of Loughner’s 
gun.
44
  Loughner’s college wanted the assurance of a mental health 
professional that Loughner was not a danger to himself or others before he 
could attend class there again.  No such requirements were needed before 
he bought a deadly weapon—a weapon that he used in a deadly manner.   
B.  James Eagan Holmes 
Like the case involving Loughner, another recent mass shooting 
involved a suspect with reports of mental instability before he purchased 
all of the firearms used in his attack.  In July 2012, James E. Holmes 
allegedly opened fire in a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, killing 
twelve people and injuring fifty-eight others.
45
  But Holmes’s case is even 
more extreme than Loughner’s. 
It is reported that Holmes’s psychiatrist alerted police regarding her 
concern of the threat Holmes posed.
46
  These concerns may have even been 
expressed before Holmes purchased a high-powered rifle from a sporting 
goods store, a federal firearms licensee.
47
  Additionally, three months 
earlier Holmes allegedly told classmates that he planned to kill people.
48
  
None of these warnings prevented Holmes from legally purchasing more 
firearms for his “growing arsenal.”49   
 How many other warning signs existed before Holmes purchased his 
other weapons remains to be seen.
50
  What is clear is that Holmes was 
determined to be a danger.  And Holmes was under the care of a 
psychiatrist who believed him to be a danger.  But the technicalities of the 
                                                                                                                          
43 Id. 
44 Cloud, supra note 2. 
45 See, e.g., Dan Harris, James Holmes Bought Rifle After Failing Oral Exam at University of 
Colorado, ABC NEWS (July 25, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/james-holmes-bought-rifle-failing-
oral-exam-university/story?id=16850268 (detailing a timeline of events that culminated in Holmes’s 
rampage during a showing of The Dark Knight Rises).  
46 Mark Greenblatt et al., James Holmes’ Psychiatrist Contacted University Police Weeks Before 
Movie-Theater Shooting: ABC Exclusive, ABC NEWS (Aug. 12, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/james-holmes-psychiatrist-contacted-university-police-weeks-
movie/story?id=16943858#.UGu1rFHe6Sp. 
47 See Harris, supra note 45 (describing how Holmes purchased the weapons “hours after failing a 
key oral exam at the University of Colorado”). 
48 See Prosecutors: Theater Shooting Suspect Told Classmate He Wanted to Kill People, 
CNN (Aug. 24, 2012, 5:14 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/24/justice/colorado-
shooting/index.html?iref=allsearch (noting Holmes’s alleged desire to kill others “when his life was 
over”). 
49 Harris, supra note 45.  
50 Jack Healy & Dan Frosch, Colorado Suspect Is Told He Faces 142 Counts as Case Inches 
Forward, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2012, at A0. 
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Gun Control Act were not met; the Gun Control Act did not prevent 
Holmes from legally purchasing his firearms.
51
     
C.  Related Instances 
Jared Loughner claimed national attention due, mostly, to his alleged 
target and the political storm that followed immediately after the Tucson 
shooting.  James Holmes’s shooting claimed more victims than any other 
mass shooting in the nation’s history.52  But those incidents are not the 
only occurrences of persons with a possible mental illness purchasing 
firearms from licensed dealers.  Even persons who, due to mental illness 
issues, should not have been allowed to purchase or possess firearms under 
the Gun Control Act have purchased firearms from licensed dealers.   
1.  Seung Hui Cho 
The most notable example is Seung Hui Cho.  On April 16, 2007, 
Seung Hui Cho shot and killed thirty-two students and faculty members 
before killing himself at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 
(Virginia Tech).
53
  Within five months of the massacre, a Virginia Tech 
review panel studied the shooting and Cho’s life, reporting its findings to 
Governor Timothy M. Kaine in August 2007.  The history, as described by 
the panel, demonstrates the failure of laws that were designed to prevent 
such a tragic loss of life.
54
   
                                                                                                                          
51 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 45 (detailing a timeline of events that culminated in Holmes’s 
rampage during a showing of The Dark Knight Rises).  
52 See Christina Ng, Prosecutor: Accused Aurora Shooter James Holmes Made Death Threat in 
March, ABC NEWS (Aug. 24, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/accused-aurora-shooter-james-holmes-
made-death-threat/story?id=17075107 (measuring by the number of people shot). 
53 REPORT, supra note 19, at vii.   
54 Id. at 1.  As early as middle school, people in Seung Hui Cho’s life noted homicidal ideations 
and referred him for psychiatric counseling.  Id. His elementary school teachers recommended him for 
therapy to address socialization issues, but in middle school, his art therapist noted trouble represented 
in his drawings.  Id. at 33, 36–37.  A few months later, after the shootings at Columbine High School, 
his school recommended psychiatric counseling; Cho had expressed in his writings that he “wanted to 
repeat Columbine.” Id. at 35.  Cho’s history is in stark contrast to the descriptions that have surfaced 
about the Columbine shooters.  See, e.g., Greg Toppo, 10 Years Later: The Real Story Behind 
Columbine, USA TODAY, Apr. 14, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-04-
13-columbine-myths_N.htm (detailing what we have learned about the Columbine shootings in the ten 
years since the shooting).   The shooters at Columbine were Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold.  Harris has 
been described as “a cold-blooded, predatory psychopath—a smart, charming liar with ‘a 
preposterously grand superiority complex, a revulsion for authority and an excruciating need for 
control.’”  Id. (quoting COLUMBINE author Dave Cullen).  Klebold, on the other hand, was anxious, 
depressed, and suicidal.  Id.  His parents, however, seemed to be unaware of his mental state.  Id.  Thus, 
it is likely he never received any counseling, much less treatment.  Cho was diagnosed and received 
medication, but the content of his writings were not revealed to his family—until after the Virginia 
Tech shootings.  REPORT, supra note 19, at 35–36.  Cho was no longer receiving any therapy or 
guidance when he entered college where, less than three years later, he would murder over thirty 
people.  See id. at 1 (stating that during Cho’s middle school and high school years his parents provided 
services to address his mental issues); see also Massie, supra note 19, at 2 (noting that the support 
mechanisms students may have received in high school disappear when they begin college); REPORT, 
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The critical issue as related to the Gun Control Act involves Cho’s 
referrals for treatment while in college.  During Cho’s third year in college, 
he began to exhibit more troubling signs in the form of “hostile, even 
violent writings along with threatening behavior.”55  Students in one class 
reduced their own class attendance, noting that “everyone’s afraid of 
[Cho].”56  The professor of the class insisted that Cho be removed from her 
class, and the department head asked the Dean of Student Affairs to have 
Cho’s objectionable writing evaluated psychologically.57  Although the 
writing was “inappropriate and alarming,” it was not considered conduct 
that was “actionable” by the school because it did not, per the Cook 
Counseling Center’s counselor’s review, contain a specific “threat.”58 
The head of the English Department did, however, follow up with Cho.  
In a letter sent prior to their meeting, Cho noted that he “seemed to get 
more attention than I want (I can just tell by the way people stare at me).”59  
During their meeting, after repeated requests, Cho finally agreed to talk to 
a counselor.
60
  The department head agreed to tutor Cho privately to make 
up for the class he was removed from, and she continued to follow up with 
the college’s Associate Dean and the Dean of Student Affairs.61  In her 
follow-up a month later, the department head noted:  
[A]ll of his submissions so far have been about shooting or 
harming people because he’s angered by their authority or by 
their behavior. . . . I have to admit that I’m still very worried 
about this student. . . . I know he is very angry, however, and 
                                                                                                                          
supra note 19, at 1 (noting that during Cho’s middle school and high school years his parents provided 
services to address his mental issues). 
55 REPORT, supra note 19, at 41.  
56 Id. at 42–43. 
57 Id. at 43. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 44.  This statement strikes the author, who admittedly has the benefit of hindsight, as 
indicative of anger and paranoia.  Although universities have counseling centers and the like, how often 
are professors and department heads educated about recognizing signs of trouble in students? 
Considering that so many mental illnesses manifest during those years for students, perhaps schools 
would be better able to intervene earlier if more education of those who work so closely with students 
occurred.  See, e.g., Kate Kelly, Lost on the Campus, TIME, Jan. 6, 2001, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,93991,00.html (discussing the fact that many college 
counseling centers are overburdened and do not have the capacity to thoroughly diagnose and treat 
students). 
College can be a breeding ground for psychiatric problems.  Poor eating habits, irregular sleeping 
patterns and experimentation with drugs and alcohol—especially combined with the academic stress of 
college life—may all play roles in triggering mental problems.  Additionally, many of the major 
psychiatric illnesses, including depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia, often do not manifest 
themselves until the late teens or early twenties.  Id. 
60 REPORT, supra note 19, at 44. 
61 Id. at 44–45. 
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I am encouraging him to see a counselor—something he’s 
resisted so far.
62
 
The professor, however, continued to work with Cho one-on-one; Cho 
eventually received an A for a grade.
63
 
That November, Cho finally spoke to a counselor—after he was 
confronted by campus police for bothering a female student.
64
 Cho 
requested an appointment with a specific psychologist (whom his professor 
had mentioned), but Cho did not keep that appointment.
65
  He spoke again 
to the counseling center via phone, but nothing more came of that.
66
  That 
day, though, another complaint about Cho was made to the campus 
police.
67
 
This time, after the campus police confronted Cho over the new 
complaints, Cho sent a text message to a suitemate stating, “I might as well 
kill myself.”68  This suicidal ideation was reported to the campus police, 
and they took Cho to the Virginia Tech Police Department for evaluation.
69
 
During this evaluation, a licensed clinical social worker noted that Cho 
“was mentally ill, was an imminent danger to self or others, and was not 
willing to be treated voluntarily.”70  Cho was referred to St. Albans 
Behavioral Health Center, a temporary detention order was issued, and 
                                                                                                                          
62 Id. at 45. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 46. 
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 47. 
69 Id. 
70 Id.  The distinction in the Gun Control Act and its interpretation between being voluntarily 
treated versus involuntarily committed seems to have little relation to the purpose behind the intent of 
keeping firearms out of the hands of the dangerous mentally ill.  If a dangerous person agrees to 
treatment when persuaded by a family member, for example, that person might be as dangerous years 
later as the person who had to be involuntarily committed—perhaps because the latter person had no 
family member involved.  The first person may find herself without a support system in the future, 
unable to recognize on her own the need for treatment.  This person could then legally purchase a 
firearm because her original commitment was voluntary, regardless of how dangerous she had been or 
is currently.  But see, e.g., VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-308.1:3(A).  Virginia State law appears to try to 
close this gap by providing for a prohibition against firearm possession even by those voluntarily 
admitted if they had been subject earlier of a temporary detention order.   
 It shall be unlawful for any person involuntarily admitted to a facility or ordered 
to mandatory outpatient treatment pursuant to § 19.2-169.2, involuntarily 
admitted to a facility or ordered to mandatory outpatient treatment as the result 
of a commitment hearing pursuant to Article 5 (§ 37.2-814 et seq.) of Chapter 8 
of Title 37.2, or who was the subject of a temporary detention order pursuant to 
§ 37.2-809 and subsequently agreed to voluntary admission pursuant to § 37.2-
805 to purchase, possess or transport a firearm. 
Id.  A gap remains, though, because unless a temporary detention order is originally required this 
provision would not apply.  
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Cho was transferred to a psychiatric bed.
71
  His admission form indicated 
that he had no history of violent behavior but that he did have access to a 
firearm; the accuracy of the latter has not been verified.
72
  He was provided 
a dosage of the anxiety medication Ativan upon admission, and he met 
with a clinical psychologist early the following morning.
73
 
Without reviewing any hospital records (unavailable to the evaluator 
due to the early hour), after a fifteen-minute evaluation, the psychologist 
found that Cho, although mentally ill, did not present an imminent danger 
to himself or others.
74
  A psychiatrist also evaluated Cho and 
recommended outpatient treatment.
75
  This, however, was based in part on 
Cho’s self-report denying any previous issues regarding his mental 
health.
76
 
During the subsequent hearing to determine whether Cho would be 
committed, the special justice reviewed the written reports completed as a 
prescreening by the evaluator and by the psychiatrist.  Cho also provided 
evidence.
77
  No other witnesses provided information for the special justice 
to consider: none of the complaining students, not the campus police 
officers who initially detained Cho, and not any of the actual evaluators, 
including the one who believed Cho to be dangerous and needing inpatient 
care.
78
  In spite of that, the special justice ruled that Cho “present[ed] an 
imminent danger to himself as a result of mental illness.”79  The special 
justice, however, did not commit Cho; he instead ordered Cho to receive 
outpatient treatment and to “follow all recommended treatments.”80  Cho 
                                                                                                                          
71 REPORT, supra note 19, at 47. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id.  One cannot help but wonder how thorough a review can be conducted in fifteen minutes 
and without reference to the records made since arrival at the facility.  If these temporary detentions do 
not qualify as actions prohibiting one from purchasing a firearm, yet the decision not to admit is made 
with such little information, another failure of the system is apparent.  See infra notes 209–14 and 
accompanying text (discussing the lack of due process for temporary or emergency detentions as a 
reason not to disqualify a person under the Gun Control Act).  
75 REPORT, supra note 19, at 47. 
76 Id. at 48.  Privacy laws prevented the psychiatrist from gathering information, and limited 
resources made gathering other information cost-prohibitive.  Id.  The Panel noted that access to 
information among agencies was imperative.  Id.  The Panel, however, concluded that a primary 
impediment to the sharing of information is based on misunderstandings of the Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974.  Id. at 65–66, 68.  
77 Id. at 48. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
80 Id.  Equally disturbing in hindsight, and perhaps more so, is the lingering question of whether, 
had Cho been admitted from some time at St. Albans, that treatment could have provided Cho with the 
emotional stability needed to ward off the impending massacre.  Of course, we have a great interest in 
not overreaching when it comes to depriving people of their liberty interest and thus in not civilly 
committing a person without actual need.  But when the oversight of that need leaves thirty-two people 
dead, maybe we have swung too far on the side of not committing persons.  Overt acts and 
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scheduled an appointment for that afternoon, but he did not return for any 
follow-up appointments.
81
  Because he had been accepted as a voluntary 
patient, there was no further communication with the Behavioral Health 
Center or the Virginia Tech campus police.
82
  None of these events were 
ever communicated to Cho’s parents.83 
Problems continued the next spring, and in Cho’s Fiction Workshop 
class, Cho submitted a writing eerily predictive of what would occur a year 
later: 
It tells the story of a morning in the life of Bud “who gets out 
of bed unusually early . . . puts on his black jeans, a strappy 
black vest with many pockets, a black hat, a large dark 
sunglasses [sic] and a flimsy jacket. . . .”  At school he 
observed “students strut inside smiling, laughing, embracing 
each other. . . . A few eyes glance at Bud but without the 
glint of recognition.  I hate this!  I hate all these frauds!  I 
hate my life. . . .  This is it. . . . This is when you damn 
people die with me. . . .”  He enters the nearly empty halls 
“and goes to an arbitrary classroom. . . .”  Inside “[e]veryone 
is smiling and laughing as if they’re in heaven-on-earth, 
something magical and enchanting about all the people’s 
intrinsic nature that Bud will never experience.”  He breaks 
away and runs to the bathroom. “I can’t do this. . . .  I have 
no moral right.”84   
Cho’s story ended with Bud encountering a gothic girl to whom Bud 
says, “I’m nothing.  I’m a loser.  I can’t do anything.  I was going to kill 
every god damn person in this damn school, swear to god I was, but I . . . 
couldn’t.”85  Several firearms are specifically referenced in the story.86  
Although the professor of the course reported concerns to the department 
                                                                                                                          
dangerousness should continue to be factors in making those determinations.  But if we had more 
involvement of the parties originally invested in the detention—here, Cho’s suitemate, the students who 
alleged harassment, his professors, the campus police—a judge or magistrate facing the incredibly 
difficult decision to remove someone’s liberty could at least do so under a more informed light.   
81 Id. at 49. 
82 Id.   
83 Id.  See generally Richard Brusca & Colin Ram, A Failure to Communicate: Did Privacy Laws 
Contribute to the Virginia Tech Tragedy?,  17 WASH. & LEE. J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 141, 142–44 
(Fall 2010) (examining faculty and administration perceptions of privacy laws as preventing disclosure 
to Cho’s parents or in sharing information with others). 
84 REPORT, supra note 19, at 50 (omissions in original Panel report). 
85 Id. (omission in original). 
86 See id. (referencing “two hand guns, and a sawed off shotgun,” as well as an “.8 caliber 
automatic rifle and a M16 machine gun”). 
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head, the professor decided to “just deal with him.”87  He scheduled two 
meetings, but Cho appeared for neither of them.
88
 
Cho’s behavior continued to reveal “disturbing themes” over the next 
year.
89
  Classmates in a Fall 2006 class reported after the shooting that they 
had, that fall, joked “that they were waiting for Cho to do something.  One 
student reportedly had told a friend that Cho ‘was the kind of guy who 
might go on a rampage killing.’”90 
In Spring 2007, Cho began to buy guns and ammunition.
91
  He did so 
despite having been adjudicated as a mental defect, that is, as dangerous 
due to mental illness.  Cho used only two firearms during his shooting 
rampage in April 2007.
92
  With a Virginia law limiting handgun purchases 
to only one per thirty-day timeframe, Cho spaced his purchases, buying a 
Walther P22 .22 caliber semiautomatic handgun on February 9, 2007, then 
a Glock 19 9-mm semiautomatic handgun on March 13, 2007.
93
  He 
bought five ten-round magazines, several fifteen-round magazines, and 
practice ammunition over a ten-day timeframe in March 2007.
94
  He had 
almost 400 bullets when he began his killing spree.
95
  
2.  Other Examples 
Suffering from a twenty-year history of mental illness, Russell Weston 
shot and killed two police officers at the United States Capitol on July 24, 
1998.
96
  Weston said his actions were intended to “prevent the United 
States from being annihilated by disease and legions of cannibals.”97  
Weston had been involuntarily hospitalized and involuntarily medicated,
98
 
yet he purchased firearms from an Illinois store.
99
  The State of Montana, it 
                                                                                                                          
87 Id. at 49. 
88 Id.  The professor initially did not reveal the writing quoted here to the panel.  Id. at 50.  Further 
inquiry had to be made; that inquiry was prompted by a reporter’s questioning.  Id. 
89 Id. at 49. 
90 Id. at 51. 
91 Id. at 52. 
92 Id. at 71. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 74. 
95 Id. 
96 Capitol Hill Slaying Suspect Is Charged, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1998, at 1–33. 
97 Bill Miller, Capitol Shooter’s Mind-Set Detailed, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1999, at A1, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/shooting/stories/weston042399.htm. 
98 Sally Satel, Crazed and Confused: A Murder Defendant Is Forced to Choose Between the 
Death Penalty and Permanent Madness, SLATE (Aug. 30, 2001, 3:00 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2001/08/crazed_and_confused.ht
ml.  
99 Marilyn Price & Donna M. Norris, National Instant Criminal Background Check Improvement 
Act: Implications for Persons with Mental Illness, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 123, 124 (2008). 
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seems, never reported his commitment.
100
  The two police officers he shot 
might be alive had the requisite information been reported.  This, of 
course, means that the federal firearms licensee (FFL) and the victims are 
dependent on a reporting system that has never been shown to be 
reliable.
101
  
Similarly, after a long history of psychiatric disorders, Lisa Duy, 
responding to the voices she heard, purchased a 9-mm semiautomatic 
handgun from an FFL in Utah after her background check revealed no 
disqualifiers.
102
  Two hours later, she took that gun and opened fire at a 
local television station where she believed, due to her delusions, 
information was being broadcast about her sex life.
103
  Duy had been 
involuntarily committed by a judge just one year before she purchased her 
gun.
104
   
These examples illustrate deficiencies in the reporting requirements for 
the NICS.
105
  The incidents involving Loughner and Holmes highlight an 
equally worrisome hole in the net used by the Gun Control Act to try to 
keep firearms out of the hands of the dangerously mentally ill—or, as the 
Gun Control Act (possibly) calls them, the mentally defective.
 106
   
                                                                                                                          
100 Id.  Weston has been held since 1998, incompetent for trial, and he has been forcibly 
medicated since 2002.  United States v. Weston, 326 F. Supp. 2d 64, 65, 67 (D.D.C. 2004). 
101 See, e.g., infra Part III (discussing the failures of the NICS system and the need for the NICS 
Improvement Act).  
102 Fox Butterfield, Hole in Gun Control Law Lets Mentally Ill Through, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 
2000, at A1 (focusing on the privacy issues that prevented information from being conveyed to the 
NICS). 
103 Id. 
104 Id.  
105 See infra Part III.A and notes 138–46 and accompanying text (explaining how the NICS 
required information to be submitted regarding mental defective/committed to a mental institution). 
106 Other tragedies occur when those with apparent mental illness possess guns—also possibly in 
violation of the Gun Control Act.  On October 12, 2011, Scott Evans Dekraai walked into a beauty 
salon in Orange County, California, carrying three handguns (a 9-mm Springfield, Smith & Wesson, a 
.44 Magnum, and a .45 Heckler & Koch), and subsequently opened fire.  Press Release, Orange County 
District Attorney, District Attorney to Seek Death Penalty Against Seal Beach Salon Shooter for 
Largest Mass Murder in Orange County History (Oct. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.orangecountyda.com/home/index.asp?page=8&recordid=2617.  His ex-wife, with whom he 
was in a custody battle, was his first target.  Id.  But he continued shooting, killing eight and critically 
injuring a ninth person.  Some say that Dekraai “snapped,” but as his story unfolded, the signs of his 
disturbance became evident.  Nancy Dillon & Bill Hutchinson, Salon Massacre: Prosecutors Seek 
Death Penalty for Scott Dekraai, for Murder of Ex-Wife, 7 Others, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 14, 2011), 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-10-14/news/30299545_1_murder-victims-salon-massacre-lucia-
bernice-kondas.  Of course, those signs were not considered until after eight people lost their lives.  It 
was discovered that Dekraai suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder following a boating accident 
in which a coworker was killed and Dekraai was left permanently disabled.  Id.; see also Elizabeth 
Flock, Seal Beach Shooter, Scott Evans De Kraai, Was Angry Because He Thought He’d Lose His 
Son, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/seal-beach-
calif-shooter-scott-evans-de-kraai-was-angry-because-he-thought-hed-lose-his-
son/2011/10/13/gIQAU3MPhL_blog.html (recounting the 2007 death of Dekraii’s twenty-six year old 
coworker, Piper Cameron).  Less than two weeks after the shooting, Dekraai’s attorneys requested anti-
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III.  GUN CONTROL LAWS
107
 
A.  Congressional Gun Control for Persons with Mental Illness  
Gun control has been pieced together almost always after a tragic event 
takes or threatens to take the lives of either many people—such as with the 
Virginia Tech shootings—or of someone with notoriety—such as Dr. 
Martin Luther King Jr. or President Ronald Reagan.
108
  After these 
shootings, the public outcry for change has been loud.  At times, Congress 
has capitalized on the opportunity to bring about changes.
109
  People who 
lean toward the far side of gun control, wanting no guns in the United 
States, make some strides after such tragic events, and often at such times, 
                                                                                                                          
psychotic medication for him.  Matt Coker, 6 Women and 2 Men, OC Homicides Nos. 45–52:  
Massacred at Beauty Salon, OC WKLY. (Oct. 24, 2011, 3:05 PM), http://blogs.ocweekly.com/navelgazi
ng/2011/10/hair_salon_seal_beach_shooting.php.  No reports have been found regarding how Dekraai 
came into possession of his firearms.   
During the final stages of writing this Article, the tragic shooting in Newtown, Connecticut took 
place during which twenty-eight people died, including twenty elementary-school children, six school 
staff members, the gunman’s mother, and the gunman, Adam Lanza.  See Tamer El-Ghobashy & 
Devlin Barrett, Dozens Killed in Conn. School Shooting, WSJ.COM (Dec. 17, 2012), http://online.wsj.c
om/article/SB10001424127887323297104578179271453737596.html.  The reasons for the shooting 
are currently unknown.  Lanza, however, did not purchase his firearms; they reportedly belonged to his 
mother, who was also found dead, allegedly shot by Lanza.  See Pierre Thomas et al, Connecticut 
School Shooting: Adam Lanza and Mother Visited Gun Ranges, Abc News (Dec. 16, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/connecticut-school-shooting-adam-lanza-mother-visited-
gun/story?id=17992396.  Thus, although horrific and tragic, the issues involved in the Newtown 
shooting are not the same as addressed in this Article.  Interestingly, though, this shooting appears to 
have been a bigger impetus to reopening discussions of gun control and legislation, namely as 
addressing assault weapons.  See, e.g., David Jackson, Obama to Gun 
Control Petitioners: “We Hear You,” USA TODAY (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/story/ne
ws/politics/2012/12/21/obama-newtown-gun-control-white-house-petitioners/1783861/.  Although 
Lanza does not appear to have purchased his firearms, much of the discussion has been regarding 
mental illness as related to mass shootings and access to firearms.  See id.  
107 Much of the information in this Section originally appeared also as background information in 
Jana R. McCreary, Falling Between the Atkins and Heller Cracks: Intellectual Disabilities and 
Firearms, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 271, 276–80 (2011).  
108 See also Jackson, supra note 106.  But scholars note that the piecemeal approach to gun 
legislation should be replaced with a comprehensive reform.  See, e.g., Allen Rostron, Incrementalism, 
Comprehensive Rationality, and the Future of Gun Control, 67 MD. L. REV. 511, 568 (2008) 
[hereinafter Rostron, Incrementalism] (“Reasonable efforts should be made to reduce gun violence, 
but those efforts should push toward a comprehensive and cohesive pattern of controls, rather than a 
crazy quilt of inconsistent and incomplete measures.”).  Filling the gaps that allow the dangerously 
mentally ill to purchase firearms should be part of that reform. 
109 See, e.g., ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 141 (3d ed. 2004).  However, it 
appears no changes are coming about in direct response to the Arizona or Colorado shootings.  See, 
e.g., Tom Cohen, Candidates Show Little Appetite for New Gun Control Laws, CNN (Jul. 26, 2012, 
7:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/26/politics/gun-control-debate/index.html?iref=allsearch.  The 
article proceeds to discuss presidential candidate, Mitt Romney: “The real point, [Romney] said, is to 
prevent people who are ‘deranged and distressed’ from ‘carrying out terrible acts,’ noting that 
Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh used fertilizer to make the explosives for the attack that 
killed 168 people in 1995.”  Id. 
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even those on the far side of wanting broad gun rights admit that the 
measures are reasonable.
110
  But the piecemeal approach and continued 
push for broad gun rights leave gaps.   
Such reactionary legislation began with the National Firearms Act in 
1934,
111
 which was predominantly prompted due to concerns of gangsters 
and organized crime.
112
  Then in 1968, in the wake of assassinations of Dr. 
Martin Luther King Jr. and Senator Robert Kennedy, Congress passed the 
Gun Control Act.
113
  The Gun Control Act sought to restrict firearms 
possession, prohibiting certain special risk groups from possessing guns 
and prohibiting the transfer of guns to such groups by licensed dealers.
114
  
The Gun Control Act addresses this in two provisions, first, stating, “It 
shall be unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm 
or ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe that such person . . . has been adjudicated as a mental defective or 
has been committed to any mental institution.”115 The second provision 
states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been 
adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed 
to a mental institution . . . to ship or transport in interstate or 
                                                                                                                          
110 See, e.g., Senate Passes NICS Improvement Act, House Concurs, NRA-ILA (Dec. 19, 2007), 
http://nraila.org/news-issues/news-from-nra-ila/2007/senate-passes-nics-improvement-act,-hou.aspx?s= 
(“The NICS Improvements Act . . . [r]equires all federal agencies that impose mental health 
adjudications or commitments to provide a process for ‘relief from disabilities.’  Extreme anti-gun 
groups like the Violence Policy Center and Coalition to Stop Gun Violence have expressed ‘strong 
concerns’ over this aspect of the bill—surely a sign that it represents progress for gun ownership 
rights.”).  It is interesting how the NRA decides that legislation must be good for gun rights advocates 
based on opposition by gun control advocates.  See Price & Norris, supra note 99, at 125 (noting that 
the NICS Improvement Act was passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate with the 
public support of the NRA). 
111 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–72 (2006). 
112 See Zimring, supra note 9, at 138 (“The National Firearms Act of 1934, after the handgun 
registration provisions were deleted, was a concentrated attack on civilian ownership of machine guns, 
sawed-off shotguns, silencers, and other relatively rare firearms that had acquired reputations as 
gangster weapons during the years preceding its passage.”). 
113 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 921–28 (2006) and in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (2006)); Amy Bingham, Shootings That 
Shaped Gun Control Laws, ABC NEWS (July 27, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/shootin
gs-shaped-gun-control/story?id=16863844#.UHy1T2i6VUQ.  
114 Zimring, supra note 9, at 149. 
115 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2006).  Other prohibitions include the ability to sell firearms to one 
who has been convicted of a felony, dishonorably discharged from the Armed Forces, or has been 
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.  Id. § 922(g)(1), (6), (9).  Congress couches its 
prohibitions under commerce restrictions; however, the Supreme Court held that Congress exceeded its 
Commerce Clause authority in enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.  See United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1) unconstitutional because it is a 
“criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic 
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms”). 
 2013] “MENTALLY DEFECTIVE” LANGUAGE  833 
foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any 
firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or 
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in 
interstate or foreign commerce.
116
 
Together, these provisions bar selling firearms to someone who has been 
“adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any mental 
institution”117 and bar such persons from possessing firearms.118   
To simply state that one may not sell a firearm to a person in this 
identified special risk population meant very little: the ban was not 
strengthened with any means of verification for any group other than 
minors.  After all, a purchaser merely needed to state he or she was 
eligible, and the dealer was able to rely on her word.
119
  The Gun Control 
Act, thus, had holes. 
Congress acted with an eye toward patching some of the holes when it 
enacted, after debating for seven years, the Firearms Owners’ Protection 
                                                                                                                          
116 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(4), (9) (2006).  Although the Lopez Court held that the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act was unconstitutional, some circuits have upheld subsequent constitutional challenges to this 
legislation because it contained a “jurisdictional” clause.  United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 
1045–46 (9th Cir. 2005).  Interestingly, despite the Court finding Congress does not generally have the 
power to regulate guns, the Court has been willing to find that Congress has the authority to regulate 
drugs.  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (recognizing that Congress 
has the authority to regulate controlled substances under the Commerce Clause). 
States use a variety of terms to discuss mental impairment in gun legislation.  The District of 
Columbia prohibits the sale of firearms to persons whom the seller “has reasonable cause to believe is 
not of sound mind” or who is under the age of twenty-one.  D.C. CODE § 22-4507 (LexisNexis 2001).  
Alabama prohibits the delivery of a pistol to a person “of unsound mind.” ALA. CODE § 13A-11-76 
(LexisNexis 2005).  California bans firearm possession by (and transfer to) persons adjudicated as “a 
danger to others as a result of a mental disorder or mental illness, or who has been adjudicated to be a 
mentally disordered sex offender.”  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 8103(a)(1) (West 2010).  Key in 
California is Section 8103 of its Welfare and Institutions Code.  Under this Section, persons who have 
“been placed under conservatorship by a court . . . because the person is gravely disabled as a result of 
a mental disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism” may not possess a firearm.  Id. § 8103(e)(1).  
Further, Section 8101 states that no one shall “knowingly supply, sell, give, or allow possession or 
control of a firearm,” to anyone covered in Section 8103, violation of which is subject to a two-to-four-
year prison sentence.  Id. § 8101(b).  However, California appellate courts have stated that a person 
who is “capable of surviving safely in freedom with the help of willing and responsible family 
members, friends, or third parties” is not gravely disabled and may still own a firearm.  San Diego 
Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. v. Neal (In re Conservatorship of Neal), 235 Cal. Rptr. 577, 578 (Ct. App. 
1987) (quoting Estate of Davis v. Treharne (In re Conservatorship of Davis), 177 Cal. Rptr. 369, 374 
(Ct. App. 1981)).  Further, the Welfare and Institutions Code specifically states that “‘gravely disabled’ 
does not include mentally retarded persons by reason of being mentally retarded alone.”  CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE § 5008(h)(3) (West 2010).  
117 For an analysis of the difference between the terms “adjudicated as mentally defective” and 
“committed to any mental institution,” see McCreary, supra note 107, at 285–88. 
118 Thus, even though the examples above in Part II.C. do not fall under the problems for whether 
they could be sold a firearm, such persons were clearly prohibited from possessing a firearm.  Anyone 
in their lives should have been aware of the danger.  Supra notes 97–113 and accompanying text. 
119 Zimring, supra note 9, at 152–53; supra notes 97–113 and accompanying text. 
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Act (FOPA) of 1986.
120
  FOPA attempted to clarify the types of persons 
prohibited from purchasing or possessing firearms under the Gun Control 
Act.
121
  Before FOPA, the Gun Control Act addressed persons who may 
have a dangerous mental illness under two titles: “Title VII prohibited a 
person whom a court had ever adjudged mentally incompetent from 
purchasing or possessing a firearm, while Title IV disqualified individuals 
who had ever been: (1) adjudicated as a mental defective; or (2) committed 
to an institution on account of mental illness.”122  However, even though 
the two titles were merged with FOPA, the prohibited person—here, that 
person adjudicated as a mental defective—still had to “police his own 
eligibility.”123 
In the interim, as FOPA was being debated, John Hinkley Jr. attempted 
to assassinate President Ronald Reagan in 1981.
124
  Hinkley was acquitted 
for that crime through a successful plea of not guilty by reason of 
insanity.
125
  But this was just the sort of shooting with notoriety that was 
needed to further deepen the gun control legislation.  Seven years later, and 
through legislative battles that lasted all that time,
126
 Congress reacted with 
                                                                                                                          
120 Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 922–30 (2000)). 
121 James B. Jacobs & Jennifer Jones, Keeping Firearms out of the Hands of the Dangerously 
Mentally Ill, 47 CRIM. L. BULL. 388, 391 (2011). 
122 Id. at 390. 
123 Id. at 391.  With respect to FOPA, scholarly author David T. Hardy noted, “A redefinition of 
other ‘prohibited person’ categories is long overdue.  FOPA’s passage, by re-enacting the categories 
dealing with mental adjudications, may be taken to accept prior narrow interpretations of these terms, 
but it sheds little light on the status of convictions in court-martials.”  The Firearms Owners’ 
Protection Act: A Historical and Legal Perspective, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 585, 642 (1986).  In a footnote, 
Hardy continued: 
 This narrowing construction reduces but does not obviate the need for a careful 
redraft of this category.  “Mental incompetence,” “mental defect” and orders of 
“commitment” may have little meaning in relation to the Congressional findings 
that possession of firearms by “mental incompetents” burdens interstate 
commerce, threatens the life of the President, impedes free speech and practice 
of religion, and is “a threat to the continued and effective operation of the 
Government . . . .”  Drafters of a revised criterion should bear in mind that the 
Supreme Court, while refusing to treat the mentally ill as a “suspect category,” 
appears more than willing to strike down burdens upon them which have no 
rational basis, and appears unwilling to “stretch the record” to find a rationale.  
Future drafters should also note that, while it is permissible to infer a continuing 
illness from the initial adjudication, many persons may have records of treatment 
or adjudication that antedate due process guarantees imposed by the Court. 
Id. at n.314 (citations omitted). 
This Article attempts to pick up from that need and begin to reopen the discussion on redrafting 
this category.  Issues of due process, as Hardy notes, will need to be tackled in the future, deeper 
conversations in order to be addressed in such a full redraft.  Id. at 589. 
124 SPITZER, supra note 109, at 126. 
125 Andrew Chow, Reagan Shooter Hinckley Aiming for Freedom, FINDLAW (Nov. 30, 2011,  
9:14 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/blotter/2011/11/reagan-shooter-hinckley-aiming-for-freedom.html. 
126 SPITZER, supra note 109, at 126. 
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the Brady Bill in 1993.
127
  The Brady Bill attempted to address a hole in 
the Gun Control Act by implementing a waiting period before the purchase 
of a handgun and by establishing a national background system check that 
would provide information to FFLs about persons not qualified under the 
Gun Control Act to purchase a firearm.
128
  
This law was implemented in two stages.  First, it established a five-
day waiting period during which time local chief law enforcement officers 
(CLEOs) were to conduct background checks, giving states time to gather 
the records and time to institute the computerized system to maintain those 
records.
129
  Then, by 1998, the NICS was to have been available for access 
by FFLs.  The FFLs were to be able to use the NICS to determine if a 
person was eligible under the Gun Control Act to purchase a firearm.
130
 
The Brady Bill, however, did not seem to account for how it would 
motivate states to provide information related to those classified as “mental 
defectives.”131  In 2007, for example, only twenty-two states provided any 
                                                                                                                          
127 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–22 (2006)).  Congress also responded to Hinkley’s acquittal 
with the Insanity Defense Reform Act in 1984.  Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 17).  See also, Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separated You from Me”:  The 
Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA 
L. REV. 1375, 1376, 1380–82 (1997) (discussing the Hinckley case, Hinckley’s acquittal, and the 
legislative battle that took place throughout).  
128 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act § 102–03.  
129 Id.  Cognizant of privacy concerns, actual mental health information need not be disclosed.  
Instead, a state could opt to instead include a person on the Denied Persons File list of the NICS.  See 
Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Response to Inquiries on the FBI’s National Instant 
Criminal Background Check System (Apr. 19, 2007), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/pre
ss-releases/response-to-inquiries-on-the-fbis-national-instant-criminal-background-check-system 
(describing that “[i]f state legislation or privacy laws prohibit the sharing of mental health information, 
states can provide information for inclusion in the Denied Persons File of NICS with no specifics on 
the mental health issue”). 
130 The provision requiring CLEOs to perform background checks was determined to be in 
violation of the Eleventh Amendment.  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).  However, by 
that time, the CLEOs continued to provide background information on their own, without a federal 
mandate.  The NICS was available shortly thereafter.  National Instant Criminal Background Check 
System, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (stating that the FBI 
launched NICS on November 30, 1998). 
131 Regrettably, information regarding this area of the Gun Control Act and the special risk 
population is saturated with the term “mental defective” used to describe persons who fail to qualify 
under the Gun Control Act to purchase a firearm.  Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(4), (g)(4), 
(s)(3)(B)(iv) (2006).  It appears this is a direct result of the language choice in 1968, “adjudicated as a 
mental defective or has been committed to any mental institution.”  Id.  Unfortunately, the coining of 
this term as a catchall phrase has led to its use by those debating the area and the government.  See, 
e.g., Marcia Purse, Perspective on Guns and Mental Illness, ABOUT.COM (Sept. 17, 2011), 
http://bipolar.about.com/od/stigma/a/070616_lapierre.htm (describing an interview with the Chief 
Executive Officer of the National Rifle Association, wherein he referred to the “mentally defective” as 
a class of persons with whom the NRA did not support having ownership of guns).  Ms. Purse is a 
writer for the About Bipolar Disorder website.  In Perspectives on Guns and Mental Illness, she quotes 
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information on mental health records.
132
  It would be fifteen years after the 
Brady Bill’s enactment before any attempt was successful in trying to 
strengthen the meaning behind the Brady Bill regarding this special-risk 
group.
133
 
That improvement to the Brady Bill came after the shooting at Virginia 
Tech.
134
  After that shooting, the Virginia Tech Review Panel included in 
its recommendations that states needed to report information “necessary to 
conduct federal background checks on gun purchases”135  Shortly after, 
Congress passed the National Instant Check System Improvement 
                                                                                                                          
a reader who wrote to Ms. Purse to complain about how Wayne LaPierre, Chief Executive Officer of 
the National Rifle Association, had talked about the NICS during an interview on CBS This Morning: 
 That being said, I do have a diagnosis of [Bipolar Disorder], and from what Mr. 
LaPierre was saying, I am mentally defective.  I flinched every time he said it, 
and he said it with gusto at least ten times in the course of the interview.  He 
never said mentally ill, only mentally defective, mentally defective, mentally 
defective.  And people wonder why so many of us “mentally defective“ people 
feel we are stigmatized. 
Id.  Continuing the use of a term over forty years old ignores the strides made in recognizing the 
importance of people and people-first language.  See generally Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46 
SMU L. REV. 373, 373–76 (1992) (arguing that the use of stereotypes, coined “sanisms,” is found 
detrimentally throughout the jurisprudence and lawyering practices of the United States); see also 
People First Language–Describing People with Disabilities, TEX. COUNCIL FOR DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISABILITIES, http://www.txddc.state.tx.us/resources/publications/pfanguage.asp (last revised Dec. 
2011) (describing common stereotypes used to refer to individuals with disabilities and advocating for 
change in these misrepresentations).   
132 Press Release, supra note 129. 
133 In the interim, other gun control legislation passed, including the controversial federal assault 
weapons ban, which subsequently expired in 2004.  Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1996 (1994) (repealed 2004).  Whether a renewed 
assault weapons ban would survive constitutional scrutiny under Heller is debatable.  It has been 
concluded that the type of arm possessed can indeed be regulated, and if the arm is not in “common use 
at the time” among Americans, the arm is not protected under the Second Amendment.  District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624–25 (2008) (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 
(1939)); see also Allen Rostron, Protecting Gun Rights and Improving Gun Control After District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 383, 388 (2009) [hereinafter Rostron, Protecting] 
(describing that “the government can ban machine guns, not because they pose a particularly serious 
threat to public safety, but because . . . they are not in common use among civilians”). 
134 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. FOR MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL RETARDATION & 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVS., INVESTIGATION OF APRIL 16, 2007 CRITICAL INCIDENT AT VIRGINIA TECH 
3, available at http://www.oig.virginia.gov/documents/VATechRpt-140.pdf [hereinafter 
INVESTIGATION] (describing the authority of the Office of the Inspector General to provide “policy and 
operational recommendations . . . to prevent problems, abuses, and deficiencies in and improve the 
effectiveness of programs and services” in response to the shootings at Virginia Tech).  Gun control 
legislation often follows shootings that gain national recognition. See, e.g., Rostron, Incrementalism, 
supra note 108, at 561–62 (describing surges of gun legislation following prominent tragedies, 
including the enactment of gun legislation in response to the Columbine and Virginia Tech school 
shootings); see also supra Part II.A (describing the tragedy at Virginia Tech by shooter Seung Hui 
Cho).  
135
 REPORT, supra note 19, at 76.  
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Amendments Act (NICS Improvement Act).
136
  The NICS Improvement 
Act was intended to strengthen the Brady Bill’s background check system 
through the NICS.
137
 
As part of the desired improvement, Congress sought to increase the 
availability of information that would result in disqualification of gun 
ownership by automating the information related to mental illness.
138
  That 
access could be automated, or at least improved, if the information were 
computerized.
139
  The NICS Improvement Act required that federal 
agencies with information related to a person falling under the categories 
of prohibited possessors
140
 report that information to the Attorney General 
at least quarterly.
141
  The Attorney General was then charged with updating 
the NICS.
142
  Further, states were to make similar information available 
when a person was adjudicated as a mental defective.
143
  Federal funds 
                                                                                                                          
136 NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-180, 121 Stat. 2559 (2008).  
137 Id. § 2, 121 Stat. at 2559–60.  Of course, regulations can cover only those who are required to 
abide by them.  Not covered by the Gun Control Act or the NICS Improvement Amendment Act are 
private sales of firearms to persons.  See Rostron, Incrementalism, supra note 108, at 556 (stating that 
“[f]ederal law requires background checks only for sales of guns by licensed dealers engaged in the 
business of selling firearms”).  While gun possession itself is prohibited for persons adjudicated 
mentally defective, the transfer of the gun is not prohibited so long as that transfer is done by a private 
individual who is not engaged in the business of selling firearms.  See id. (discussing that an individual 
who fails a background check at a gun store may instead purchase from “a friend, co-worker, neighbor, 
a stranger on the street, at a gun show, or through a classified ad in the local newspaper”).  Some states, 
such as California and Pennsylvania, have implemented the background-check requirement for all 
transfers.  Id.  Some have estimated that half of all gun sales involve used guns, and thus are likely not 
covered by the required background checks.  See Philip J. Cook, Stephanie Molliconi & Thomas B. 
Cole, Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 69–70 (1995) (finding data 
supportive of the conclusions that approximately half of all gun sales involve used guns and that 
approximately forty percent occur in secondary markets rather than in regulated markets). 
138 See NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, § 102(c)(3), 121 Stat. at 2566–67 
(requiring that the states submit names and other relevant identifying information concerning 
individuals who have been adjudicated as a mental defective or committed to a mental institution to the 
NICS); see also Associated Press, Mental Health Records Not in Gun Database, NBC NEWS (Nov. 26, 
2005, 10:08 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10214838/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/ (describing 
the legislation that would mandate the sharing of mental health records and require states to improve 
their computerized record-keeping of those individuals who are barred from purchasing guns).  Some 
complained that prohibiting gun possession by persons with mental illness was unfair in that it denied 
their rights based on a medical condition.  Id.  Although Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in 
Heller, seemed to dismiss any question of constitutionality of this prohibition, it certainly has not been 
analyzed as a distinct issue.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (discussing that the question of constitutional 
objections to firearms regulations has not presented itself to the Court).  The NRA, however, supported 
the NICS Improvement Act and negotiated for a release from a disabilities provision, which was 
subsequently included. Rostron, Incrementalism, supra note 108, at 555. 
139 NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, § 2(6), 121 Stat. at 2560. 
140 This applies to persons listed under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 (g) and (n). NICS Improvement 
Amendments Act of 2007, § 101, 121 Stat. at 2561. 
141 Id. 
142 Id.  
143 Id. § 102, 121 Stat. at 2566–67. 
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could be withheld from states that failed to comply.
144
  States were to be 
provided grants to assist with the cost of upgrading their information—
creating electronic systems, and collecting and analyzing data.
145
  Failure 
to comply was to result in loss of funds as allocated under the Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
146
  The initial review period to 
determine compliance would not begin until 2011; that review would 
extend for two years.
147
 
The deadline to comply with the NICS Improvement Act has come and 
gone, and in spite of the threat of losing federal funds, not all states are 
complying.
148
  In February 2011, a month after the compliance deadline 
passed, nine states had provided no information,
149
 and seventeen other 
states had sent fewer than twenty-five names.
150
  Surely, those states had 
more than twenty-five persons who have been adjudicated as mental 
defects.
151
  Moreover, the percentage of denials based on having been 
adjudicated as a mental defective or committed to a mental institution 
could easily be interpreted as a lack of those records—rather than as a lack 
of persons thereby ineligible attempting to purchase firearms.  The chart in 
the Appendix hereto shows the number of denials that were based on 
mental health issues as compared to all denials.
152
  This number, of course, 
does not include those persons such as Seung Hui Cho, Russell Weston, 
                                                                                                                          
144 Id. at 2565.  
145 Id. § 103, 121 Stat. at 2567. 
146 Id. § 104, 121 Stat. at 2569. 
147 Id. 
148 Greg Bluestein, Most U.S. States Don’t Follow Mental Illness Gun Law, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Feb. 17, 2011, 2:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/17/few-states-follow-mental-
_n_824738.html.  
149 Id.  Problems with the distribution of promised funds and with privacy laws were cited as 
roadblocks to the information being submitted by the states.  Id.  “As of October 30, 2011, the number 
of records maintained in the NICS Index Mental Defective File totaled 1.3 million. A significant 
percentage of these records, however, are from a small number of states.”  The Fix Gun Checks Act: 
Better State and Federal Compliance, Smarter Enforcement: Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism (Nov. 15, 2011) (statement of Asst. Dir. David Cuthbertson, 
Asst. Dir., Criminal Justice Information Services Division of the FBI), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-fix-gun-checks-act-better-state-and-federal-compliance-
smarter-enforcement.   
150 Id. 
151 Looking at the records for more than eleven years, the NICS has reported 6103 denials due to 
prohibitions based on mental health issues or adjudications.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) OPERATIONS 
2010 13 (2010), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/reports/2010-operations-
report/2010-operations-report-pdf. 
152 The total denials between November 30, 1998 and January 31, 2012 were 905,616, and only 
0.89% of those were due to issues as related to “Adjudicated Mental Health.”  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FEDERAL DENIALS: WHY THE NICS SECTION DENIES, available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/reports/020212denials-1.pdf.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2012); infra 
Appendix at p. 864. 
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and Lisa Duy who were ineligible to purchase guns but who passed the 
background check and thus were not denied purchase.
153
 
In passing the NICS Improvement Act, Congress referenced the 
Virginia Tech shooting as an impetus to the legislation’s enactment:  
On April 16, 2007, a student with a history of mental illness 
at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University shot 
to death 32 students and faculty members, wounded 17 more, 
and then took his own life.  The shooting, the deadliest 
campus shooting in United States history, renewed the need 
to improve information-sharing that would enable Federal 
and State law enforcement agencies to conduct complete 
background checks on potential firearms purchasers.  In spite 
of a proven history of mental illness, the shooter was able to 
purchase the two firearms used in the shooting.  Improved 
coordination between State and Federal authorities could 
have ensured that the shooter’s disqualifying mental health 
information was available to NICS.
154
 
In discussing the findings and definitions, the focus regarding the 
inadequate data was on “mental health” and mental illnesses.155  However, 
even with that discussion, no clear definitions or explanations were put 
forth regarding what it meant to have been adjudicated or what was meant 
by being committed to a mental health facility.  This, of course, is what the 
Virginia Tech Review Panel seemed to blame for Cho’s firearm 
purchase.
156
  Thus, the law as it exists today—with the Gun Control Act 
amended by the Brady Bill and amended again by the NICS Improvement 
Act—remains unclear.  And that lack of clarity could lead to more 
tragedies.
157
 
Knowing the issues, the Government Accountability Office conducted 
a study assessing the success of the NICS Improvement Act, reporting its 
                                                                                                                          
153 Price & Norris, supra note 99, at 124. 
154 NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-180, § 2(9), 121 Stat. 2559, 
2559–60 (2008). 
155 Id. § 2, 121 Stat. at 2560. 
156 INVESTIGATION, supra note 134, at 71–73. 
157 Of course, regulations can cover only those who are required to abide by them.  Not covered 
by the Gun Control Act or the NICS Improvement Amendment Act are private sales of firearms to 
persons. Rostron, Incrementalism, supra note 108, at 556.  While gun possession itself is prohibited for 
persons adjudicated mentally defective, the transfer of the gun is not prohibited so long as that transfer 
is done by a private individual who is not engaged in the business of selling firearms.  Id.  Some states, 
such as California and Pennsylvania, have implemented the background-check requirement for all 
transfers.  Id.  Some have estimated that half of all gun sales in California involve used guns, and thus 
are likely not covered by the required background checks.  See Philip J. Cook, Stephanie Molliconi & 
Thomas B. Cole, Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 69–70 (1995) (finding 
data supportive of the conclusions that approximately half of all gun sales involve used guns and that 
approximately forty percent occur in secondary markets rather than in regulated markets). 
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findings in July 2012.
158
  The improvements of twelve states created the 
biggest impact on the statistics, but more than half of the states had 
increased their number of reported prohibited persons under this category 
by fewer than one hundred.
159
  The threatened penalties by the Department 
of Justice have never been imposed.
160
   
Seung Hui Cho’s adjudication had not been reported and thus was not 
available during a background check.  Russell Weston and Lisa Duy also 
slipped through the cracks and their disqualifying issues appeared not to 
have been reported.  But as previously noted, reporting was not necessarily 
the problem with Jared Lee Loughner or James E. Holmes.  Neither had 
reached the point of commitment.  One problem leading to this is the Gun 
Control Act language and its far too broad interpretation.   
B.  Interpretations of the Gun Control Act Language  
When the Gun Control Act was passed, debate took place regarding 
who should be, as a matter of law, prohibited from possessing firearms.  
On the surface, it is easy to read the plain language in the Gun Control Act, 
prohibiting possession by or transfer to persons who have been 
“adjudicated as a mental defective or committed to a mental institution.”161  
However, what that language means is unclear.  Moreover, some 
jurisdictions disagree on the understanding of exactly who should be 
considered as falling within this category, leaving some states more 
vulnerable to incidents such as what happened that January day in Tucson 
and that July day in Aurora, Colorado. 
The narrowing of populations eligible to purchase or possess a firearm 
became one of the major objectives of the Gun Control Act, denying 
specific populations access to firearms—felons, minors, and “persons who 
had been adjudicated as mental defectives or committed to mental 
institutions.”162  The goal was to deny access to firearms to these “special 
risk groups” or, at the very least, punish those who provided such access.163  
The Gun Control Act barred the knowing transfer of guns or ammunition 
to the named groups.
164
  The Gun Control Act achieved this task easily 
with some groups: determining who is a minor is as easy as seeing proof of 
                                                                                                                          
158 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-684, GUN CONTROL: SHARING PROMISING 
PRACTICES AND ASSESSING INCENTIVES COULD BETTER POSITION JUSTICE TO ASSIST STATES IN 
PROVIDING RECORDS FOR BACKGROUND CHECKS (2012), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592452.pdf. 
159 Id.  
160 Id.  
161 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2006). 
162 Zimring, supra note 9, at 149.  
163 Id. at 152.  
164 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).   
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age, something most people have.
165
  Also, felony convictions are recorded 
and tracked.
166
  However, because of the difficulty in applying the 
disqualifying language, the Gun Control Act (and subsequent amendments) 
left a wide gap in the limitations intended to be imposed on those 
“adjudicated mental defective” and “committed to a mental institution.”   
Those tasked with interpreting—and applying—the language have fared no 
better.  
In discussing the prohibition that eventually resulted in the adopted 
language, “adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any 
mental institution,” senators most often used “mentally incompetent”167 to 
describe such persons, intermittently using “psychotics,”168 
“psychopaths,”169 “mentally deficient,”170 “mentally or emotionally 
disturbed persons,”171 and “deranged persons.”172  Only one reference 
among those addresses what would likely be understood to refer to 
                                                                                                                          
165 However, as has been argued and seen in voter disenfranchisement situations, many citizens do 
not have government-issued identification.  See Julien Kern, As-Applied Constitutional Challenges, 
Class Actions, and Other Strategies: Potential Solutions to Challenging Voter Identification Laws After 
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629, 631–32 (2009) (describing the 
challenges that both certain minority groups and mainstream voters may encounter in trying to obtain 
state identification under laws such as Indiana’s Voter ID Law).  This calls into question issues of 
discrimination regarding the lawful purchase of firearms for persons, especially rural persons without 
proof of age.  
166 The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–22 (2006)) requires that background checks are conducted 
prior to sales by licensed firearms dealers.  As a method to complete those checks, Congress required 
the FBI to implement the NICS, which tracks felony convictions, within five years of the passage of the 
Brady Bill.  See Jacobs & Jones, supra note 121, at 393 (describing the establishment of the NICS and 
the databases which a prospective purchaser’s background may be checked); see also National Instant 
Criminal Background Check System, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics (last visited Sept. 15, 
2011) (providing an overview of the NICS process).  However, states did not necessarily submit the 
required data to the NICS, which led to the passage of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-180 § 2, 121 Stat. 2559 (2008).   
167 See Anthony P. Dunbar, Torts—Liability of a Gun Dealer for Selling to a “Mental 
Incompetent,” 58 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1276 (1984) (citing congressional remarks in revealing the 
history of the Gun Control Act’s adopted language including 114 CONG. REC. 26,718 (1968) (remarks 
of Sen. Dodd)) (arguing that an overly expansive definition of “mental incompetent” will likely cause 
gun dealers to err on the side of caution and refuse to sell guns to both those with a legitimate mental 
illness and people who simply seem dishonest or odd); 114 CONG. REC. 26,718, 27,406 (1968) (letter 
submitted by Sen. Ervin); id. at 25,786 (statement submitted by Sen. Mansfield & Sen. Tydings); id. at 
26,826, 27,409, 27,416 (remarks of Sen. Tydings); id. at 23,070 (remarks of Rep. Corman). 
168 114 CONG. REC. 26,718, 23,070 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Anderson).  
169 Id. at 23,072 (remarks of Rep. Horton).  
170 Id. at 27,404 (remarks of Sen. Percy).  The use of “mentally deficient” seems to indicate that 
persons with intellectual disabilities were intended to be covered by the language, at least by some 
members of Congress, but it is unclear if persons who have intellectual disabilities fall into the category 
of “adjudicated mentally defective.”  See McCreary, supra note 107, at 285–88 (addressing the history 
of the “mentally deficient” language, including congressional remarks and different courts’ 
interpretations). 
171 114 CONG. REC. 27,420, 27,420 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Cannon).  
172 Id. (remarks of Sen. Byrd).  
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intellectual disabilities (mentally deficient).  And when asked, it seems that 
few people would question that dangerous persons with mental illness were 
intended to be singled out as a member of the special risk group who 
should not possess a firearm.  But that understanding is both too broad and 
too narrow.  And it is anything but simple.   
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to comment on the language 
of the Gun Control Act in Huddleston v. United States.
173
  In dicta, the 
Court considered the aims of the legislation prohibiting possession by 
specified groups.  The goal involved keeping “these lethal weapons out of 
the hands of criminals, drug addicts, mentally disordered persons, 
juveniles, and other persons whose possession of them is too high a price 
in danger to us all to allow.”174  The Court noted that the goal was to keep 
firearms from persons where it would be “contrary to the public 
interest.”175  The Court later noted that the Gun Control Act was intended, 
in addition to affect sales, to “keep firearms away from the persons 
Congress classified as potentially irresponsible and dangerous.”176 
Even with the Supreme Court’s review, nothing has been clarified.  
Most anyone understands that the law is intended to keep firearms away 
from people who are “irresponsible and dangerous,” but determining who 
is irresponsible and dangerous has been done, well, irresponsibly.  And this 
has led to dangerous consequences.
177
  The concern, of course, is that we 
not go too far.  Just because a person has a diagnosed mental illness should 
not be reason enough for removing the person’s Second Amendment right 
of self-defense in his home.
178
  But in trying to strike a balance of interests, 
the scale is tipped too far on the side of caution for the rights while leaving 
death on the other side.   
                                                                                                                          
173 Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 825 (1974) (holding that the prohibition against 
making a false statement to a firearms dealer applies also to a transaction at a pawnshop).  
174 Id. (commenting about who Congress wanted to prevent from obtaining firearms) (quoting 114 
CONG. REC. 13,219 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Tydings)).  
175 Id. at 824.  
176 Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 213, 218 (1976) (addressing the conviction of a person 
who possessed a firearm in violation of the Gun Control Act due to his status as a convicted felon and 
concluding that the Gun Control Act applied to the behavior in question, the intrastate receipt of a 
firearm that had previously been transported in interstate commerce).  
177 Supra note 17 and Part II.A–B (detailing the psychological histories of the perpetrators of two 
of the most publicized gun-related crimes in recent history: the Virginia Tech campus shooting and the 
Tucson Arizona shooting of Representative Gabrielle Giffords and others).  
178 The relationship between mental illness and violence is complicated.  See, e.g., Price & Norris, 
supra note 99, at 123, 128 (suggesting that although there is an increased risk of violence displayed by 
the mentally ill, such risk may actually be smaller than commonly thought).  The key focus on reform 
must be on the dangerously mentally ill—not just those who are adjudicated or even committed.  See 
supra note 17 and accompanying text (providing facts about types of mental illnesses, the rate at which 
they affect American adults, and some available treatment methods).   
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1.  Adjudicated as a Mental Defective   
One of the mental health-related prohibitions against owning a firearm 
applies to those so adjudicated by a court as mental defectives and only 
when notice of the adjudication is provided to a national database.
179
  What 
it means to be “adjudicated as a mental defective,” though, is not clear 
enough for consistent application. 
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) 
provides a definition of the language in the Code of Federal Regulation 
(C.F.R.):   
Adjudicated as a mental defective.  
(a) A determination by a court, board, commission, or other 
lawful authority that a person, as a result of marked 
subnormal intelligence, or mental illness, incompetency, 
condition, or disease: 
(1) Is a danger to himself or to others; or 
(2) Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his 
own affairs. 
(b) The term shall include– 
(1) A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal case; and 
(2) Those persons found incompetent to stand trial or 
found not guilty by reason of lack of mental responsibility 
pursuant to articles 50a and 72b of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 850a, 876b.
180
 
Although the C.F.R. definition provides a starting point for 
understanding how this Gun Control Act language will be interpreted, even 
that language is unclear.  Even so, key areas do appear to emerge from this 
                                                                                                                          
179 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2006).   
180 27 C.F.R. § 478.11(a) (2010); see also Rostron, Incrementalism, supra note 108, at 551–52 
(addressing the lack of notice of mental illness adjudication in Virginia which allowed Seung Hui Cho 
to purchase firearms in spite of a background check).  In 2008, only four states regularly provided the 
information needed to keep the database current, and less than half of the states provided any 
information regarding mental health records.  Id. at 552–53.  Of particular concern, though, is what 
qualifies as a “court, board, commission, or other lawful authority” as an entity that could remove 
someone’s (now-understood) constitutional right.  27 C.F.R. § 478.11(a) (2010).   
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definition: adjudication, dangerousness, and mental capacity.
181
  At issue as 
related to mental illness are adjudications of dangerousness.
182
  
Shortly after the enactment of the Gun Control Act, and before the 
ATF had provided a definition,
183
 the Eighth Circuit in United States v. 
Hansel
184
 analyzed the “adjudicated as mental defective” language and 
concluded that it does not apply to persons with mental illness.
185
  The 
Mental Health Board found that Hansel, the defendant, was mentally ill.
186
  
However, even if that could be considered “an adjudication,” the Eighth 
Circuit held, it was not the same as being adjudicated as mental 
defective.
187
  The court referred to the testimony of the doctor from the 
case who said he understood “mental defective” to be “synonymous with 
mental retardation.”188  Further, as the court noted, “In law, a distinction 
                                                                                                                          
181 A formal finding in a criminal trial process of insanity or a lack of competence to stand trial 
seems clear; still, such information would have to be communicated to any NICS system.  Given that 
the records of felons seem to be better communicated, this creates less worry than the information as 
related to the other areas of the definition.  
182 The identification of mental capacity should be understood to refer to intellectual disabilities.  
See McCreary, supra note 107, at 276–77, 280.  What should not be confused, though, is the high 
burden of determining dangerousness regarding removing a person’s full liberty through a civil 
commitment.  Indeed, expert testimony may be questionable at times and predicting one’s 
dangerousness propensities is challenging—not at all an exact science.  See, e.g., Samantha Godwin, 
Bad Science Makes Bad Law: How the Deference Afforded to Psychiatry Undermines Civil Liberties, 
10 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 647, 683 (2012) (stating that psychiatric explanations of mental illness are 
not based on reliable principles and methods, and that determinations of “dangerousness” among those 
with mental illness are usually not reliable).  But we must view the restriction against firearm purchase 
and possession without as great a burden for civil commitment.  Although the Supreme Court has 
identified this right as an individual right under the Constitution, see District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008), the right cannot outweigh the interest of the public in keeping those who are 
dangerous from purchasing or possessing a firearm—while being allowed, however, to live outside of 
civil commitment.   
183 It is plausible that the ATF’s definition which included mental illness as a contributor to 
mental defectiveness for purposes of the Gun Control Act was in response to this opinion.  
184 474 F.2d 1120 (8th Cir. 1978). 
185 Id. at 1121, 1123.  In Hansel, the defendant had been admitted to a hospital “for a brief period 
of observation.”  Id. at 1122.  Because this hospitalization was not in accord with civil commitment 
statutes in Nebraska, the State conceded that the defendant had not been “committed.” Id.  Thus, the 
case turned on whether it could be held that the defendant had been “adjudicated” mentally defective.  
Id. at 1121.  
186 Id. at 1122.  
187 Id. at 1123.  
188 Id.  For a person to receive a diagnosis of intellectual disability, there must be a “significant 
limitation” in intellectual functioning. Definition of Intellectual Disability, AAIDD, 
http://www.aaidd.org/content_100.cfm (last visited Sept. 20, 2011) (“Intellectual disability is a 
disability characterized by significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive 
behavior, which covers many everyday social and practical skills.  This disability originates before the 
age of 18.”).  Although not required, an IQ test may be used, and that score must typically measure 
below seventy—more than two standard deviations below the median—for such a diagnosis.  See, e.g., 
id. (stating that a score must typically measure below seventy for such a diagnosis).  This provides 
some sort of objective data regarding how far below normal qualifies as an intellectual disability and 
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has usually been made between those persons who are mentally defective 
or deficient on the one hand, and those who are mentally diseased or ill on 
the other.”189  The conclusion focused on subnormal intelligence as the 
target of legislation prohibiting those adjudicated as mentally defective 
from possessing firearms.
190
  And although the court pointed to at least one 
other decision that interpreted “mental defective” differently, the court 
asserted it was giving the phrase its general meaning.
191
  Finally, the court 
distinguished a person with intellectual disabilities from a person with 
mental illness by stating, “A mental defective, therefore, as has often been 
said, is a person who has never possessed a normal degree of intellectual 
capacity, whereas in an insane person faculties which were originally 
normal have been impaired by mental disease.”192  
The court concluded that Congress had not intended to prohibit 
possession from all persons who had any history of mental illness.
193
  This 
is in stark contrast to what is often understood about the Gun Control 
Act.
194
  The Eighth Circuit followed the Fifth Circuit and thus concluded 
that for a person with a mental illness to be prohibited from possessing a 
firearm that person must have been committed to a mental institution.
195
  
In United States v. Vertz,
196
 a Michigan federal district court held that 
no adjudication of mental defectiveness had occurred in spite of court-
ordered treatment and commitment.
197
  In Vertz, the defendant had been 
treated for mental illness for twenty years, having been diagnosed with 
personality disorders and psychological problems.
198
  Even though the 
defendant had been ordered by a judge to obtain treatment, because there 
was no finding that the defendant was a danger (or incapable of managing 
his affairs),
199
 he did not meet the definition of having been adjudicated as 
a mental defective.
200
  Thus, in understanding Vertz, mental illness alone 
                                                                                                                          
means that only people who fall statistically and significantly below the “normal” scale, and not merely 
those with below average intelligence, are considered disabled.   
189 Hansel, 474 F.2d at 1124. 
190 Id. at 1124–25. 
191 Id. at 1125. 
192 Id. at 1124.   
193 Id. at 1125. 
194 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008) (“[N]othing in our 
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill.”).   
195 United States v. Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334, 1337 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Hansel, 474 F.2d at 
1123).  Again, the burden should be higher to commit a person due to dangerous mental illness than 
that required to prevent a person from purchasing or possessing a firearm.  See infra note 235 (arguing 
that the burden on the government is higher for involuntary commitments). 
196 102 F. Supp. 2d 787 (W.D. Mich. 2000). 
197 Id. at 788. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Vertz, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 790–91. 
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will not disqualify a person from gun purchase or possession under the 
Gun Control Act—even mental illness that results in a court order to obtain 
treatment.
201
  Instead, there must be an adjudication of dangerousness—or 
commitment.   
On the other hand, the First Circuit has recently muddied the waters of 
interpreting the adjudicated leg of Section 922(g)(4).  In United States v. 
Rehlander,
202
 the court applied District of Columbia v. Heller
203
 as 
requiring due process before anyone could be denied Second Amendment 
rights.
204
  The First Circuit had previously affirmed a conviction for a party 
who had been held pursuant to a five-day emergency order.
205
  In holding 
the opposite in Rehlander when addressing a situation involving an 
“emergency procedure” hospitalization, the court concluded that because 
the procedure involved in the involuntary hospitalization did not include an 
adversary proceeding, then no due process occurred.
206
  The court 
concluded that this could not suffice for a commitment for the purposes of 
disqualifying a person from gun purchase or possession.
207
 
Although the Rehlander court addressed a question of interpreting the 
commitment side of the Gun Control Act prohibitions,
208
 if the same logic 
is applied to the “adjudicated as a mental defective” language, difficulties 
could arise.  For example, the definition includes a determination of 
dangerousness by “a court, board, commission, or other lawful 
authority.”209  Should that determination be made by a court, an adversarial 
proceeding seems likely, satisfying the concerns expressed in Rehlander.  
But if that determination is reached by a board, no such guarantee seems 
likely. 
Additionally, this disqualifier requires an adjudication of 
dangerousness.  The other, though, involves commitment.
210
  In 
commitment issues, a person’s liberty is removed, and with that 
infringement on liberty, due process is guaranteed.
211
  But for a 
                                                                                                                          
201 This should help alleviate the concerns that the prohibition is too inclusive.  See, e.g., supra 
notes 17, 178 and accompanying text (mentioning that more than mere mental illness is required for 
disqualification). 
202 666 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2012). 
203 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
204 Rehlander, 666 F.3d at 48.   
205 See United States v. Chamberlain, 159 F.3d 656, 665 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that an 
involuntary five-day commitment is statutorily sufficient), overruled by United States v. Rehlander, 
666 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2012). 
206 Rehlander, 666 F.3d at 50–51. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 27 C.F.R. § 478.11(a) (2010).   
210 See infra Part IV (discussing this other disqualifier). 
211 See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 
715 (1972)). 
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determination of dangerousness, if the decision is not to commit, no such 
consideration of due process is likely.
212
 
Further, not all states have the same prohibition regarding “adjudicated 
as mental defective.”  For example, in Virginia, the code prohibits those 
adjudicated incompetent from possession or purchasing firearms.
213
  
However, that section addresses incompetence in the same manner as the 
Gun Control Act does as related to those unable to contract or manage 
personal affairs.  The Virginia section addressing mental illness issues does 
so only as related to commitment or orders for treatment with no 
prohibition for possession merely for a finding—even a formal, adversarial 
finding—of dangerousness.214  Thus, the judge determining that Cho 
“present[ed] an imminent danger to himself as a result of mental illness” 
would not have disqualified Cho from purchasing a firearm under the 
current Virginia law.
215
 
Finally, and most importantly, we must consider what information is 
reported. After all, if those who are reporting the information do not 
interpret “adjudicated as a mental defect” in the manner that appears to be 
intended by the ATF, that information will never be conveyed.  Consider, 
for example, the State of Texas’s Frequently Asked Questions as related to 
the NICS Act.
216
  In addressing “Which type of cases should I report?” 
only the following are listed: 
1. Commitments for temporary or extended inpatient 
mental health services; 
2. Acquittals in criminal cases for reasons of insanity or 
lack of mental responsibility, whether or not the person 
was ordered to receive inpatient treatment or residential 
care under Chapter 46C, Code of Criminal Procedure; 
                                                                                                                          
212 This raises more issues regarding whether now there is a need for due process in removing 
Second Amendment rights—whether, in other words, Rehlander was decided correctly. 
213 VA. CODE  ANN. § 18.2-308.1:2 (2012).   
214 VA. CODE  ANN. § 18.2-308.1:3 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person involuntarily admitted to a facility or ordered to 
mandatory outpatient treatment . . . involuntarily admitted to a facility or ordered to 
mandatory outpatient treatment as the result of a commitment hearing . . . or who 
was the subject of a temporary detention order . . . and subsequently agreed to 
voluntary admission . . . to purchase, possess or transport a firearm.   
Id. 
215 REPORT, supra note 19, at 48.  This is especially significant if an order for outpatient treatment 
would not be held sufficient to disqualify a person from firearm purchase or possession. 
216
 Frequently Asked Questions: Reporting Mental Health Cases Required by HB 3352, available 
at http://www.txcourts.gov/oca/pdf/faq.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2012). 
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3. Commitments of a person determined to have mental 
retardation for long-term placement in a residential care 
facility under Chapter 593, Health and Safety Code; 
4. Adult guardianships; and 
5. Cases in which a person is found to be incompetent to 
stand trial under Chapter 46B, Code of Criminal 
Procedure.
217
 
Thus, Texas, like Virginia, does not seem to interpret “adjudicated as a 
mental defect” as anything related to dangerousness, in spite of the ATF 
language.  But especially interesting is the rationale provided for the 
reporting of the records: 
After the April 2007 shooting tragedy at Virginia Tech, it 
became apparent that very few mental health records had 
been made available to the FBI for background checks. The 
NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (NIAA) was 
passed to address the gap in information available to NICS 
about prohibiting mental health adjudications and 
commitments and other prohibiting factors. [In addition, it] 
required the automation of records to reduce delays for law-
abiding gun purchasers.
218
 
Although the Virginia Tech shooting is used as a reason for the improved 
reporting,
219
 none of what is required to be reported in Texas would have 
prevented Cho from buying a firearm.   
If courts, states, administrative agencies, and the like cannot 
understand or agree on what is meant by “adjudicated as a mental 
defective,” it seems unlikely that individuals will know exactly when they 
have fallen under that umbrella.
220
 
                                                                                                                          
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id.  
220 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FIREARMS TRANSACTION RECORD PART I—OVER-THE-
COUNTER 1, available at http://www.atf.gov/forms/download/atf-f-4473-1.pdf  (last revised Apr. 2012) 
(“Have you ever been adjudicated mentally defective (which includes a determination by a court, 
board, commission, or other lawful authority that you are a danger to yourself or to others or are 
incompetent to manage your own affairs) OR have you ever been committed to a mental institution?” 
(emphasis omitted)).  The form provides further information in the instructions:  
 Committed to a Mental Institution:  
 A formal commitment of a person to a mental institution by a court, board, 
commission, or other lawful authority.  The term includes a commitment to a 
mental institution involuntarily.  The term includes commitment for mental 
defectiveness or mental illness.  It also includes commitments for other reasons, 
such as for drug use.  The term does not include a person in mental institution 
for observation or a voluntary admission to a mental institution.  
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2.  Committed to a Mental Institution 
Adding to the lack-of-clarity problem are different interpretations and 
applications of the language “committed to a mental institution.”221  This is 
the portion of the Gun Control Act language that the Virginia Tech Review 
Panel took note of.
222
  And this is an especially problematic area in which 
states differ. 
The ATF provides that “commitment to a mental institution” means: 
A formal commitment of a person to a mental institution by a 
court, board, commission, or other lawful authority.  The 
term includes a commitment to a mental institution 
involuntarily.  The term includes commitment for mental 
defectiveness or mental illness. It also includes commitments 
for other reasons, such as for drug use.  The term does not 
include a person in a mental institution for observation or a 
voluntary admission to a mental institution.
223
   
But like adjudicated as a mental defective,
224
 the language has not been 
consistently interpreted or applied. 
Shortly after the Gun Control Act’s enactment (and again, before the 
ATF provided a definition), the Eighth Circuit faced a case in which it had 
to decide if the defendant, convicted of violating the Gun Control Act, had 
indeed been prohibited from firearms possession.
225
  The Board of Mental 
Health had found the defendant to be mentally ill and in need of 
commitment.
226
  However, once admitted, the doctor on staff determined 
that the defendant did not have a serious mental disorder and was not in 
                                                                                                                          
Id. at 4.  Special provisions are included for members of the military who were adjudicated by the 
Department of Veterans’ Affairs.  Id. 
221 See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 19, at 71–73 (comparing federal law, where both inpatient and 
outpatient treatment were considered “committed to a mental institution,” to Virginia law, where the 
status of outpatient treatment was unclear). 
222 See id. (discussing the uncertainty of Cho’s right to purchase firearms under Virginia law 
given the uncertainty of the language). 
223 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2010). 
224 Interestingly, the ATF itself here distinguishes between mental defectiveness and mental 
illness, but in its own definition for adjudicated as a mental defective, it refers to mental illness.  Id.; 
see supra notes 220–22 and accompanying text (discussing the difference in interpretation of mental 
defectiveness under state and federal law).  It is this sort of circular, overlapping language that causes 
problems in application. 
225 United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120, 1121 (8th Cir. 1973).   
226 Id. at 1122.  In Hansel, it appears that the Mental Health Board alone made the decision 
regarding Hansel’s commitment.  Id. at 1123.  Thus, the likelihood that sufficient due process occurred 
is low, contradicting the issues raised in Rehlander.  See United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 48–
50 (1st Cir. 2012) (discussing the need for due process in suspending Second Amendment rights 
following an involuntary hospitalization for mental health). 
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need of hospitalization.
227
  Two weeks later, the defendant was released 
and then formally discharged.
228
   
The Eighth Circuit determined that because the statutory procedures 
for civil commitment had not been followed, the defendant had not been 
“committed” to a mental institution for purposes of the Gun Control Act.229  
Instead, the defendant had been held at the hospital only for 
observations.
230
  And the court stated that the Gun Control Act makes clear 
that a commitment is required.
231
 
Returning to Vertz, and addressing the other possible reason for 
prohibition from gun ownership, the District Court for the Western District 
of Michigan also addressed the issue of commitment by analyzing two 
time periods when the defendant faced hospitalization.
232
  In September 
1988, a probate court determined that the defendant was mentally ill and 
needed treatment after he was admitted for involuntary treatment based in 
part on a physician’s certificate, signed after the defendant had been 
threatening suicide.
233
  A second physician concurred a few days later.
234
  
However, the probate court order did not result in hospitalization because 
an alternative treatment program to meet the defendant’s needs was 
available.
235
   
In June 1993, the defendant was involuntarily admitted to a medical 
center after a physician signed a certificate noting that the defendant posed 
                                                                                                                          
227 Hansel, 474 F.2d at 1122. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 1123.  Cf. United States v. Vertz, 40 F. App’x 69, 73–74 (6th Cir. 2002) (refusing to rely 
on Michigan commitment requirements in determining whether the defendant had been “committed” 
such as would preclude legal firearm possession: “[t]o give preclusive effect to each state’s individual 
definition of terms in the firearms statute would be to frustrate one of the main purposes of the law, 
which is to provide for national uniformity in the application of firearms restrictions”). 
230 Hansel, 474 F.2d at 1123. 
231 Id.; see also 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2010) (“The term [committed to a mental institution] does not 
include a person in a mental institution for observation . . . .”).  
232 Vertz, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 789. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id.  Advocates for the rights of those with mental illness encourage using the least restrictive 
alternative when considering treatment options for persons.  See Position Statement 22: Involuntary 
Mental Health Treatment, MENTAL HEALTH AM., http://www.nmha.org/go/position-statements/p-36 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2012) (“[I]nvoluntary treatment in an in-patient setting should only occur as a last 
resort and should be limited to instances . . . when no less restrictive alternative will respond adequately 
to the risk.”).  The Mental Health America is formerly known as the National Mental Health 
Association. Our History by Decade, MENTALHEALTHAMERICA,  
http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/centennial/history.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2012); see also Ken 
Kress, An Argument for Assisted Outpatient Treatment for Persons with Serious Mental Illness 
Illustrated with Reference to a Proposed Statute for Iowa, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1302–06 (2000) 
(discussing the potential benefits of utilizing outpatient treatment before involuntary hospitalization is 
required). 
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the likelihood of injury to others.
236
  (He had been threatening to kill the 
president.
237
)  The defendant was discharged three days later.
238
 
The court held that the 1988 hospitalization qualified for 
“commitment” for purposes of prohibiting firearms possession under the 
Gun Control Act.
239
  The court noted the recent trend among other circuits 
to separate the question of adjudication from the question of 
commitment.
240
  The court cited other cases finding that commitment to 
restore competency to stand trial had qualified as commitment
241
 as had 
emergency commitment lasting only five days and followed by voluntary 
admission.
242
 And a commitment based on two physicians’ 
recommendations, but without a formal judicial process, also had qualified 
as commitment for purposes of the Gun Control Act.
243
  Because the Vertz 
defendant’s 1988 stay at a hospital had been based on two physicians’ 
certificates, even though the court order itself did not result in inpatient 
involuntary hospitalization, the court held that Vertz’s situation qualified 
him as a person who had been “committed to a mental institution.”244  
In reaching its decision, the court appeared to give special credence to 
the First Circuit’s acknowledgement that the benefit of including more 
people in the prohibition against gun possession—without a full judicial 
determination—was great and presented a stronger government interest:  
To require a full-scale adversary proceeding and a finding, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that a person is mentally ill 
and poses a likelihood of harm to himself or others before 
giving effect to the firearms ban would undermine 
Congress’s judgment that risk or potential, not likelihood, 
probability, or certainty, of violence is all that is required. 
Nor does it appear that Congress intended that only persons 
conclusively found to be suffering from mental illnesses or 
difficulties after having been afforded the fullest possible 
panoply of due process rights be deemed to have been 
“committed to a mental institution” for purposes of the 
                                                                                                                          
236 Vertz, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 789. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 791. 
240 Id. at 790. 
241 Id. (citing United States v. Midgett, 198 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
242 Id. (citing United States v. Chamberlain, 159 F.3d 656, 664 (1st Cir. 1998), overruled by 
United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2012)). 
243 Id. (citing United States v. Waters, 23 F.3d 29, 31–36 (2d Cir. 1994)).  Whether this could 
stand under the First Circuit’s new requirement for due process remains unclear.  See Rehlander, 666 
F.3d at 48–50 (holding that a permanent suspension of Second Amendment rights following an 
involuntary hospitalization requires formal adjudication). 
244 Vertz, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 791. 
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firearms ban.  That level of formality is not required for most 
of the categories Congress identified as within the firearms 
ban, including those who have merely been indicted for a 
crime.  When Congress has intended that a particular status 
triggering the firearms ban be conditioned upon notice and 
the opportunity to be heard, along with other procedural 
rights, it has stated so explicitly.
245
 
The ATF’s definition has not been controlling.  The Fourth Circuit 
held that commitment to restore competency was a disqualifying event 
even though that is not a category under the definition.
246
  On the other 
hand, the First Circuit has appeared to reverse its determination that an 
emergency detention serves as a disqualifying event, but the court did not 
do so by referencing the ATF definition; it did so based on Heller.
247
  The 
Second Circuit’s decision, then, that a person had been committed in a 
manner to serve as a disqualifying event based only on the certification of 
two physicians and not due to a formal adversarial process appears to be at 
risk for reversal if the Second Circuit falls in line with the First.
248
 
The only consistency in the above is the confusion created in trying to 
apply the Gun Control Act’s language.    
IV.  TOWARD SAFETY:  IDEAS FOR NEW STANDARDS FOR FIREARM 
PURCHASE AND POSSESSION BY THE (DANGEROUSLY) MENTALLY ILL 
The State of Virginia launched an extensive investigation into trying to 
understand how the tragedy occurred there—the tragedy that ended the 
lives of thirty-two people.  The Review Panel made recommendations, and 
agencies reacted.  But like a lot of reactionary legislation, its effect may be 
limited.  Those who proposed or voted for change might feel better—or be 
able to use such in a campaign speech—but little change actually takes 
place.  Under the Gun Control Act, after all, neither Jared Lee Loughner 
nor James E. Holmes was prohibited from purchasing his deadly weapons.   
Granted, legislation exists that attempts to address this.  The Gun 
Control Act itself appears to directly limit possession of a firearm by 
persons belonging to named groups: minors and felons and persons with 
mental illness or who have been adjudicated mentally defective.
249
  The 
language, although barely fifty-years old, is so engrained in society’s 
thoughts regarding who can possess a firearm that Justice Scalia, writing 
                                                                                                                          
245 Id. at 790–91 (quoting Chamberlain, 159 F.3d at 664) (citation omitted).  But see Rehlander, 
666 F.3d at 50–51 (holding that due process is required to remove one’s Second Amendment rights); 
supra notes 202–09 and accompanying text (discussing Rehlander). 
246 United States v. Midgett, 198 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1999). 
247 Rehlander, 666 F.3d at 50. 
248 United States v. Waters, 23 F.3d 29, 31–36 (2d Cir. 1994). 
249 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 (b), (d) (2006).  
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for the majority in Heller, seemed to assert that these prohibitions are 
almost presumed to be constitutional:  
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second 
Amendment is not unlimited. . . . Although we do not 
undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full 
scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion 
should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on 
the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or 
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places 
such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
arms.
250
 
Thus, although the Court recognized the Second Amendment as an 
individual right providing for the possession of a handgun in one’s home 
for self-defense purposes, limiting whom this right applies to regarding 
persons with mental illness appears to be acceptable.
251
  Justice Scalia’s 
conclusion that the limitation is acceptable is not explained by him, but its 
legality is presumed.
252
 
Adding to the trouble in this area is the debate between several groups.  
On the one hand, advocates for the rights of the mentally ill typically assert 
that constitutional rights should not be infringed upon merely because of a 
mental illness.
253
  Additionally, proponents of broad gun rights tend to 
object to any legislation that might limit the free possession of weapons 
among citizens.
254
  These two groups, however, appear to hold too 
staunchly to their positions without being willing to truly investigate the 
deeper, underlying issues that call for attempts at reducing improper and 
ill-advised gun possession.
255
 
                                                                                                                          
250 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). 
251 Id.  
252 See id. at 627 n.26. (describing a prohibition on the possession of firearms by the mentally ill 
as a “presumptively lawful regulatory measure[]”); see also Rostron, Protecting, supra note 133, at 387 
(“The majority then offers a list of other ‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures,’ but without even 
trying to explain how it has arrived at the conclusion that these particular sorts of gun control laws are 
constitutional.” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26)). 
253 See, e.g., Position Statement 22: Involuntary Mental Health Treatment, supra note 235; 
Michael Perlin, “A Change Is Gonna Come”: The Implications of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the Domestic Practice of Constitutional Mental Disability 
Law, 29 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 483, 483 n.1 (2009) (listing cases addressing areas of constitutional rights 
affecting those with mental disabilities).  These issues are likely to be at the forefront of challenges and 
debates regarding a recent law enacted in New York requiring mental health professionals to report 
patients who exhibit behavior that might be indicative of a risk of dangerousness.  See David Ariosto, 
N.Y. Governor Signs Nation’s First Gun-Control Bill Since Newtown, CNN (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/15/us/new-york-gun-bill/index.html. 
254 See generally SPITZER, supra note 109, at 14–15 (discussing objections to gun control 
legislation among gun rights advocates). 
255 E.g., id. at 174–76. 
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The Virginia Tech Review Panel suggests federal incentives be put in 
place to ensure information is reported, noting that “[i]n a society divided 
on many gun control issues, laws that specify who is prohibited from 
owning a firearm stand as examples of broad agreement and should be 
enforced.”256   
But that is not enough.  The Gun Control Act language is not enough.  
Instead, actual reform needs to occur to prevent the dangerously mentally 
ill, even if not committed to a mental institution, from purchasing and 
possessing firearms.  In that reform, Congress should consider shifting the 
burden of reporting to the purchaser, perhaps in the form of obtaining a 
permit, broadening the definition of commitment to prevent the Virginia 
Tech gap, and correcting the definition of mentally defective. 
A.  Shifting the Burden to the Purchaser 
The NICS Improvement Act has not been effective across all states.
257
  
In spite of the attention paid to the NICS when the date under the 
Improvement Act arrived and records were to be current, the chatter over 
the inadequacies of reporting has died down.   
Further, privacy issues as related to reporting mental health records 
continue to worry health professionals.
258
  Schools have misunderstood 
which privacy regulations apply as related to students in mental health 
treatment.
259
  Mental health professionals and those who advocate for 
persons with mental illness fiercely want to protect the records of those 
with mental illness.
260
  However, much of this problem involves a limited 
understanding of how the NICS system works.  A person’s medical history 
is not necessarily revealed to the FFL conducting a background check if 
state law prohibits such disclosure; instead, a state may share only that a 
person should be included in the denied persons list without revealing 
specific information as related to mental illness.
261
  Instead, if a person 
does not qualify, only that information is made available to the seller.
262
  
                                                                                                                          
256 REPORT, supra note 19, at 76. 
257 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 158, at 19. 
258 See REPORT, supra note 19, at 65 (discussing how federal and state laws both state that health 
information is private and can only be disclosed if requested by the person who is the subject of the 
records, if disclosure is necessary in order to make medical treatment effective, or in situations where 
privacy is outweighed by other interests); Frequently Asked Questions: Reporting Mental Health Cases 
Required by HB 3352, supra note 216 (highlighting privacy concerns); see also supra note 253.    
259 REPORT, supra note 19, at 75. 
260 Price & Norris, supra note 99, at 124–25.   
261 Press Release, supra note 129. 
262 Dep’t of Justice Info. Sys., The National Instant Criminal Background Check System: 
Correction of Erroneous System Information, Part 25, § 25.10 (Oct. 30. 1998), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/federal-register-october-30-1998-on-nics. 
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The person attempting to make the purchase is provided, upon request, 
contact information to personally—and privately—follow up.263 
Considering these and other issues, rather than relying on outside 
agencies to provide and gather information from every state agency and 
hospital in order to determine who might not qualify for gun possession 
based on a mental illness issue, we should approach this issue from the 
reverse angle: insist that the person who wants to purchase a gun be 
required to prove her fitness to do so.  This can be done in the form of a 
medical certificate or, preferably, in the form of a permit. 
Under the idea of either a medical certificate or a permit, persons 
would not be discouraged from seeking treatment or even, when warranted, 
hospitalization.
264
  If hospitalization, whether voluntary or involuntary, 
were not accompanied by an automatic removal of one’s Second 
Amendment rights, then persons seeking treatment would have one less 
excuse not to get the full help that might be medically warranted.  
Additionally, this could encourage a continuing development of a 
relationship with a physician who could monitor a patient’s progress and 
work with the patient on this issue.  When the person with a diagnosed 
mental illness approaches her physician to discuss the need for a mental 
health certificate to purchase a firearm, the physician is on notice of the 
person’s proclivity toward firearm use and the possibility that there are 
new issues of paranoia (wanting the firearm for protection) or 
dangerousness (wanting the firearm to use against someone).
265
  This 
provides an excellent therapeutic opportunity for the physician to engage in 
a conversation with the person.
266
  More importantly, this would be an 
issue only for persons who wish to purchase or acquire a firearm; no one 
else’s mental health records would be exposed. 
Expanding the medical certificate to a requirement for a permit would 
address not only the issues raised in this Article, but would also provide 
solutions for problems stemming from, for example, the gun-show 
                                                                                                                          
263 See id.  
264 Supra Part IV.B. 
265 Such a system would likewise require the assurance that physicians who provide this 
certification are immune from tort liability should a party cause harm with a firearm, either through 
negligent handling or through intentional use.  A determination that a clearly identifiable threat existed, 
however, would preempt immunity in states that follow the Tarasoff line of reasoning which holds 
professionals liable for failure to warn. 
266 Consider also a recent bill introduced in Florida that proposed that doctors not be allowed to 
ask parents about gun possession in a home.  This was met with great outrage by physicians; as they 
argued, physicians have an interest in the safety of their patients.  See Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, No. 11-
22026-Civ., 2012 WL 3064336, at *1–3 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012) (describing the Florida law that 
protected patients’ privacy rights regarding firearm ownership and the opposition that it met from 
physicians who claimed that information about firearm possession is relevant to a patient’s care). 
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loophole.
267
  Requirements for a permit could include a mental health 
certification, as well as a background check for criminal records using an 
NICS database.  This permit could then be used for any gun transaction, 
including that with an FFL, at a gun show,
 
between private citizens, etc.  
Under a system requiring a permit, only persons who are attempting to 
obtain a firearm would need to have their mental health records considered.  
As long as the person reviewing the permit had no reason to believe the 
permit was invalid, the person could transfer, sell, or give the firearm to the 
authorized recipient.
268
  For private transactions, a permit issued within the 
past two years should be sufficient.  For retail or gun-show transactions, 
however, the permit plus an on-the-spot NICS check could be used to 
further prevent those who fall through the cracks of gun control legislation 
from purchasing firearms illegally. 
Requiring a permit merely to purchase a firearm might also lessen a 
push towards the federal government implementing a registration of all 
firearms, a registration some fear could lead to a firearms list kept and 
tracked by the federal government.
269
  Distinguished from a registration, 
the issues raised here are not about what firearms are owned
270
 or how 
                                                                                                                          
267 See Andrew Goddard, A View Through the Gun Show Loophole, 12 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 
357, 357–58 (2009) (discussing the ability for people to make occasional sales of firearms from a 
personal collection at a gun show without the need to obtain a federal license to sell firearms).   
268 Perhaps by instituting some sort of tort—or even criminal—liability on anyone who sold a 
firearm to another person when the seller was reckless regarding the validity of the license or the 
mental state of the purchaser, we would be closer to closing this loophole. 
269 See, e.g., Lindsey Boerma, NRA President: Door-to-Door Gun Confiscation a “Legitimate 
Fear,” CBS NEWS (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-34222_162-57564389-
10391739/nra-president-door-to-door-gun-confiscation-a-legitimate-fear/. 
 One of his fears: that a universal background check for anyone purchasing a 
firearm—the first of Mr. Obama’s suggestions today—would lead to a national 
tracking registry of gun owners.  That, in turn, Keene said, could give way to 
“forced buybacks,” or, door-to-door confiscation of specific weapons by the 
government. 
 In other words, “I have a record that you have a shotgun, and you're going to sell 
it to the government, or else,” Keene said. “That's the equivalent of 
confiscation.” 
Id.  However, the comments by Mr. Keene, NRA President, are illogical.  A background check merely 
indicates who has applied to purchase a firearm; it does not, in any manner, provide a list of what 
firearms are actually owned by someone.  Similarly, applying for a concealed weapons permit merely 
allows a person to carry a concealed weapon; it does not necessarily notify any government agency of 
what firearms are owned or carried by the permit holder.   
270 Since the shooting at the elementary school in Newtown Connecticut, many have argued for 
reinstating the ban on assault-style weapons.  See, e.g., Gary Langer, After Newtown Shootings, Most 
Back Some Gun Controls, Poll Shows, ABC NEWS (Jan. 14, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politic
s/2013/01/on-eve-of-newtown-recommendations-most-back-new-gun-control-measures/.  Reinstating 
the ban was also part of President Obama’s proposals as shared immediately before this Article went to 
print.  See President Barrack Obama, Speech on Gun Control Measures, Jan. 16, 2013 (transcript 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/president-obamas-remarks-on-new-gun-control-
proposals-jan-16-2013-transcript/2013/01/16/528e7758-5ffc-11e2-b05a-605528f6b712_story.html). 
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many are owned, gathered, or collected.  The issue is who seeks to 
purchase or possess firearms when persons with dangerous mental illness 
are so easily able to acquire firearms.  Thus, a permit to acquire is 
preferred over a registration of firearms, perhaps calming some fears of 
those who oppose gun control legislation. 
One problem with this idea is that it creates a disparate impact on the 
poor.  If we require a medical certification or a permit based on a 
physician’s approval, such physician visits and permits could present a cost 
to the would-be gun possessor.  Thus, for this idea to be implemented, we 
must also allow Medicaid to pay for this examination; the permit, much 
like registering to vote, should come without a cost to the citizen.  
Otherwise, it will be unjustly burdensome for the poor to obtain the 
necessary mental health certificate or permit. 
The proposal here is that we proactively seek to determine if there is 
that risk or potential of violence rather than reactively, perhaps after Jared 
Loughner or James Holmes acts, determining in hindsight and when faced 
with widespread fatalities that, indeed, violence was a near-certainty. 
Additionally, implementing the requirement for a permit does not 
necessarily raise due process concerns.
271
  Along with a permit 
requirement, there must be procedural protections in place to allow any 
person denied a permit the opportunity to appeal the denial in an 
adversarial proceeding.  For if courts are comfortable with a finding that 
one doctor’s recommendation that a person receive treatment is sufficient 
to remove a person’s right to liberty,272 then it follows that the court should 
be equally as comfortable to require proving one’s fitness to possess 
firearms based on a doctor’s recommendation.    
To prevent “gaming” the system, once a physician is approached by a 
patient requesting the required certificate whom the physician deems unfit, 
this determination would need to be provided to the NICS database.  
Again, the patient could appeal such a determination, but the system could 
not allow for the patient to “doctor shop” until she found a physician 
willing to grant approval.  Thus, patients who merely wish to seek mental 
health counseling, even if they need to discuss ideations of dangerousness 
                                                                                                                          
271 See supra notes 202–09 and accompanying text. 
272 Determinations for civil commitment may be made on very little evidence of mental illness 
and dangerousness—often requiring the testimony of only one licensed physician.  See, e.g., S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 44-17-530.  Although clear and convincing evidence is the standard, scholars conclude that 
psychiatrists are more likely to testify leaning in favor of commitment rather than in favor of out-
patient treatment.  See, e.g., William M. Brooks, The Tail Still Wags the Dog: The Pervasive and 
Inappropriate Influence by the Psychiatric Profession on the Civil Commitment Process, 86 N.D. L. 
REV. 259, 263 (2010); Grant H. Morris, Defining Dangerousness: Risking a Dangerous Definition, 10 
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 61, 66 (1999).  
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or suicide, will not have their information shared unless they also express a 
desire to acquire a firearm.
273
 
States allow for civil commitment to a mental institution even when no 
dangerousness is present, allowing involuntary commitment if one is not 
able to care for herself,
274
 and regarding those committed due to 
dangerousness, states use different definitions for understanding who 
might be “dangerous.”275  With different definitions, persons committed in 
one state may not be committed in another state, depending on how the 
term dangerous is defined for the deciding body.  A federal law requiring a 
proactive approach by the purchaser to prove fitness to purchase and 
possess a firearm would be more consistent and fairer across 
jurisdictions.
276
 
This issue is, of course, broad: the Second Amendment is a right that is 
freely established and automatic.
277
  But so too is the right to free 
assembly.
278
  And rules exist regulating that right such that those requiring 
a party wishing to assemble to obtain a permit before doing so.
279
  The 
balance of interests in requiring such a permit shows that the government’s 
legitimate interest outweighs the minor inconvenience for a party to obtain 
a permit.  Similarly, the government’s great interest in assuring the 
dangerously mentally ill do not possess firearms greatly outweighs any 
minor inconvenience in obtaining a certificate of approval for gun 
possession. 
                                                                                                                          
273 See Ariosto, supra note 253. 
274 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 426.130 (allowing commitment of a person determined to be 
mentally ill (as defined in Section 426.005, allowing a person to be found mentally ill if she is 
“[u]nable to provide for basic personal needs and is not receiving such care as is necessary for health or 
safety”)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-580 (allowing commitment if one “lacks sufficient insight or 
capacity to make responsible decisions with respect to his treatment”).  But see Brooks, supra note 272, 
at 263 (noting that numerous jurisdictions removed a parens patria type of justification for involuntary 
civil commitment).    
275 Cf. Jana R. McCreary, Not Guilty . . . Until Recommitment: The Misuses of Evidence of the 
Underlying Crime in NGRI Recommitment Hearings, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 1253, 1267 (2009) 
(identifying different problems with two states’ definitions—or lack thereof—of “dangerous” as used 
for recommitment of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity, statutes with language directly 
from or the same as those for involuntary civil commitment); see also Brooks, supra note 272, at 265 
(explaining the difficulties of defining dangerousness). 
276 The United States District Court in Montana recently held that the Gun Control Act was a 
valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.  Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder,  
No. CV-09-147-DWM-JCL, 2010 WL 3926029, at *22 (D. Mont. Aug. 31, 2010). 
277 See U.S. CONST. amend. II (“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear arms[] shall not be 
infringed.”). 
278 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble . . . .”). 
279 See, e.g., Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322 (2002) (explaining that regulations that 
ensure the safety and convenience of the public by requiring a party to obtain a permit to use public 
land are not inconsistent with civil liberties). 
 2013] “MENTALLY DEFECTIVE” LANGUAGE  859 
Most people I have discussed this idea with respond by saying “That 
will never happen” or “There is no way Congress would do that.”  Until 
December 2012, I believed they were correct.  But after the Newtown, 
Connecticut shooting on December 14, 2012,
280
 public opinion may be 
shifting.
281
  However, even though it seems that public opinion favors more 
gun control, the strength of those who advocate for gun rights will almost 
certainly outweigh any move toward a national requirement for registration 
of all firearms.
282
  But we also must not go too far, as New York appears to 
be skating towards by infringing on the confidentiality of all patients who 
seek mental health treatment and who may have ideations of 
dangerousness about themselves or others.
283
  Regarding firearms, then, a 
proactive approach to prove one’s fitness and background is the better 
approach.  Instead of relying on states to report vague information,
284
 we 
should place the burden on the person who wants to acquire a firearm.  
One cannot help but wonder what one is hiding if she does not want to 
have her background checked, or if she is reluctant to seek a physician’s 
determination that she does not present a danger to society in owning a 
firearm.   
Even with this information, though, other approaches could work to 
ensure safety and to close the gaps of defective language.   
B.  Broadening the Definition of Commitment 
The ATF provided a definition of committed to a mental institution 
that included involuntary commitment to an institution and explicitly 
excluded voluntary admission.
285
  Further, excluded from the ATF’s 
definition is admission for observation—seemingly, those emergency 
admissions used to determine if a formal commitment is warranted.
286
  
                                                                                                                          
280 See El-Ghobashy & Barrett, supra note 106. 
281 See Langer, supra note 270; Alan Greenblatt, What Are The Odds of Gun Control Changes?, 
NPR.ORG (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/12/19/167640400/what-are-the-odds-of-gun-
control-changes. 
282 See, e.g., Alan Greenblatt, What Gun Control Could Look Like, NPR (Dec. 17, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/2012/12/17/167463334/what-gun-control-could-look-like. 
283 Thomas Kaplan & Danny Hakim, New York Has Gun Deal, with Focus on Mental Ills, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/15/nyregion/new-york-legislators-hope-for-
speedy-vote-on-gun-laws.html?_r=0.  “[S]uch a requirement ‘represents a major change in the 
presumption of confidentiality that has been inherent in mental health treatment. . . . The prospect of 
being reported to the local authorities, even if they do not have weapons, may be enough to discourage 
patients with suicidal or homicidal thoughts from seeking treatment or from being honest about their 
impulses.’”  Id. (quoting Dr. Paul S. Appelbaum, Director of the Division of Law, Ethics, and 
Psychiatry at the Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons).  
284 See, e.g., id. (“Calling on states to do a better job of uploading their mental health records into 
national databases would address this issue without in any way impinging on gun rights, says Wilson, 
the Roanoke College public affairs professor.”). 
285 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2010). 
286 Id.   
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Nothing, though, is said about commitment to outpatient treatment.  All of 
these issues need clarification and consistent treatment, and all of them 
should be considered relevant in serving as disqualifiers.  The other 
important consideration is that the disqualifiers include a concern with 
dangerousness, not simply commitment. 
1.  Voluntary Admission 
Included in a disqualifying commitment to a mental institution should 
be voluntary admission.  The only seemingly logical argument against this 
is that the person who is able to make the rational decision to seek 
treatment and help is rational enough to purchase a firearm.  This does not 
hold up to a deeper examination. 
First, when someone has an active, involved family, often the family 
members are able to talk the person into voluntary admission.
287
  This is 
therapeutic in the sense that the family is not seen in an adversarial manner 
and can assist in the course of treatment.
288
  But should this happen, the 
person who willingly admits herself to a hospital when needed to obtain 
treatment will never be “committed” under any of the Gun Control Act or 
ATF language, nor will that person likely face “adjudication.”289  Thus, a 
plethora of persons who are dangerously mentally ill will never be reported 
in any NICS database—because they have active, involved families.   
Additionally, having a patient who has been held for temporary 
observation and who then voluntarily admits himself is also therapeutic in 
that the patient may feel a sense of control over the course of his treatment.  
This, of course, is more easily achieved after that initial observation period, 
especially if medication has assisted in stabilizing the person.
290
 
Finally, we must consider the issue of medication.  In that initial 
emergency observation hospitalization, medication may be used 
involuntarily if there is a sense of danger to self or other.
291
  No hearing is 
held; this can be accomplished based on a determination of treating 
physicians.  Its use, after all, is temporary.  But within forty-eight or 
seventy-two hours of the start of that observation period, a person may 
then be asked to admit himself to hospitalization.
292
  It is possible that, 
                                                                                                                          
287 See NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS MINN., UNDERSTANDING THE MINNESOTA CIVIL 
COMMITMENT PROCESS 3 (2006), http://www.namihelps.org/assets/PDFs/civilcommitmentSinglePg10
2108.pdf (describing how a mental health emergency often triggers the concern of family members 
who may consider Civil Commitment for the person).  
288 Jacobs & Jones, supra note 121, at 394 n.41 and accompanying text. 
289 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2010). 
290 Cf. Study Presented to JCHC Finds Longer Periods of Temporary Detention Lead to 
Reduction in Civil Commitments, 31 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 12 (July 2012).   
291 See, e.g., Hightower by Dahler v. Olmstead, 959 F. Supp. 1549, 1566 (N.D. Ga. 1996) 
(authorizing forced medication of a patient in psychiatric care).  
292 Cf. Study Presented to JCHC Finds Longer Periods of Temporary Detention Lead to 
Reduction in Civil Commitments, 31 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 12 (July 2012). 
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under the influence of sedating medications, the person would be more 
willing to do so then than otherwise.  Thus, a question lingers as to whether 
a voluntary admission really is actually voluntary.  But no question exists 
as to the dangerousness of the behavior that led to that initial observation 
period.  This is why the most crucial change would be to include an 
emergency observation period as qualifying as one having been committed 
to a mental institution.    
2.  Temporary Observation 
Courts have concluded that a temporary observation hospitalization 
should not serve as a disqualifying event under the Gun Control Act.
293
  
But it must. 
When one is held for the short period to determine whether full civil 
commitment procedures need to be engaged in, that is because an 
emergency situation exists.  The person has been submitted to the custody 
of the state because of reports of dangerousness to self or others.
294
  
Someone has observed the person’s behavior and determined that cause 
exists sufficient to warrant removing that person from society.  These same 
issues should warrant anyone of reasonable caution to agree that such 
person should neither purchase nor possess a firearm. 
Consider too that the disqualification need not be permanent.  Anyone 
may petition for removal from the list of those ineligible to purchase a 
firearm.  Thus, the right may be restored. 
And as explained above, the temporary observation may be necessary 
only until the person is stabilized—such as with an adjustment to a 
medication dosage.  Should the person, after the stabilization occurs, not 
need inpatient treatment and subsequently agree to pursue outpatient 
treatment, this person will not be ineligible to purchase or possess a 
firearm.  But even if the behavior and risk is not sufficient to remove 
someone’s liberty with a civil commitment due to the security of the 
stabilization, it would seem that on the sliding scale of interests involved, 
                                                                                                                          
293 United States v. Hansel, 474 F. 2d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 1973) (explaining that nothing in the 
Gun Control Act indicates that a person who has been hospitalized for observation is prohibited from 
the possession of firearms); United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that a 
person who has been temporarily in a mental institution was not prohibited from owning a gun under 
the Gun Control Act). But see United States v. Waters, 23 F.3d 29, 31–36 (2d Cir. 1994) (allowing a 
temporary involuntary confinement that was later changed to a voluntary admission to be considered a 
“commitment” for purposes of applying the prohibition against possession of firearms).  
294 Removing all guns for persons with mental illness, without any showing of dangerousness, is 
as absurd as removing the same right of all convicted felons.  White-collar crime should not raise the 
same issues as a murder conviction.  Not all white-collar crimes lead to firearms prohibitions.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 921 (a)(20)(A) (2006) (“The term ‘crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year’ does not include—any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade 
practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business  
practices . . . .”). 
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restricting that right to a firearm would be reasonable under the 
circumstances until one might be assured that the stabilized state would 
continue. 
3.  Court-Ordered Outpatient Treatment 
As related to the above, states also vary regarding whether court-
ordered outpatient treatment serves as a disqualifier of commitment to a 
mental institution.
295
  This is how Virginia changed its law, such that those 
ordered for outpatient treatment would be ineligible to purchase a 
firearm.
296
  Although Virginia changed its laws related to outpatient 
treatment, not all states have followed suit and the ATF has not included 
this ineligibility in its definition.
297
 
One of the problems with voluntary admission to inpatient treatment is 
the push by any covering insurance company to discharge the person as 
soon as possible.  Further, courts are under increasing pressure to impose 
the least restrictive treatment for persons who need intervention in their 
care due to mental illness.
298
  Thus, a court may order a person who is 
dangerous but who has some support system in the community
299
 to seek 
outpatient treatment.  This could be more therapeutic in the person’s course 
of treatment, and this prevents the ultimate loss of liberty involved in a 
civil commitment.  In other words, we should not be required to remove a 
person’s liberty to assure the person is ineligible to purchase a firearm. 
C.  Correcting the Mental Defective Issue 
Finally, the ATF language defining who is ineligible to purchase or 
possess a firearm should be edited to clearly differentiate between persons 
with intellectual disabilities and those with dangerous mental illnesses.  
The use of adjudicated as a mental defect is not only outdated, but is (and 
always should have been deemed) pejorative.  This language should be 
                                                                                                                          
295 Frequently Asked Questions: Reporting Mental Health Cases Required by HB 3352, supra 
note 216.  
296 See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1:3 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person involuntarily 
admitted to a facility or ordered to mandatory outpatient treatment . . . involuntarily admitted to a 
facility or ordered to mandatory outpatient treatment as the result of a commitment hearing . . . or who 
was the subject of a temporary detention order . . . and subsequently agreed to voluntary admission . . . 
to purchase, possess or transport a firearm.”). 
297 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 790.065(2)(a)4.b (2012) (“The phrase [“committed to a mental 
institution”] . . . does not include a person in a mental institution for observation or discharged from a 
mental institution based upon the initial review by the physician or a voluntary admission to a mental 
institution.”). 
298 See, e.g., Andrea M. Odegaard, Note, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Impact of Mental 
Health Courts on the Criminal Justice System, 83 N.D. L. REV. 225, 233 (2007). 
299 This is odd considering Cho was essentially alone at Virginia Tech.  Perhaps the judge thought 
the school would follow up on his care.  Of course, we know that was not true.  Not only that, but no 
one followed up to make sure Cho complied with the court order.  REPORT, supra note 19, at 49. 
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updated to reflect what most have understood it to be: a prohibition against 
a person who, because of mental deficiency or intellectual disability, is 
unable to manage her affairs.  Mental illness should be excluded from this 
portion of the prohibition.   
Updating the committed to a mental institution as recommended above 
in a manner to encompass voluntary admission, temporary observations, 
and court-ordered outpatient treatment when there is also a finding of 
dangerousness would remove any need to lump persons with mental illness 
into the first part of this special-risk group.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
The oft-heard phrase, “Guns don’t kill people; people kill people” 
rings true: guns are not the problem; the problem lies in who has the guns.  
The long-standing prohibition against the mentally ill from possessing 
firearms is now presumed to be constitutional.  But simply to say that a 
person with mental illness is prohibited from possessing a gun is not 
enough.  Nothing prevents that person from legally purchasing a gun in 
many cases.   
Persons with dangerous mental illness might not be formally 
committed to a mental institution.  And whether one has been 
“adjudicated” as a mental defect varies depending on state statutes and 
jurisdictional interpretations.  Unless and until what it means to be 
committed is clarified, many more will fall into a loophole, often created 
by poor insurance coverage, by the ready ability to game the system, or 
simply by persuasive doctors.   
Polarized sides disagree about gun control and gun rights.  But this 
issue is not about removing all guns or allowing all guns.  The solution is 
to clarify our intent: prevent persons with dangerous mental illness from 
purchasing firearms by requiring persons to obtain a permit or to prove 
their medical and mental health fitness before acquiring additional 
firearms.  This will not prevent all access of firearms by potentially 
dangerous persons, but it is a step in the right direction.  If it had not been 
so easy for Jarrod Lee Loughner to buy his gun or for James E. Holmes to 
buy his, many lives might have been spared.  
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APPENDIX  
Federal NICS Denials in Firearms 
Background Checks, 11/30/98 to 1/31/12
Total Federal Denials
Denials Due to "Adjudicated
Mental Health"
 
